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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES C. ENGLERT and JO ANN
ENGLERT, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Case No. 910490
HENRY E. ZANE and DOROTHY G. ZANE
husband and wife, and JOHN A.
McNEIL and KATHY McNEIL, husband
and wife,

Category No. 16

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The
pursuant

to

Supreme
Section

Court has

jurisdiction

78-2-2(3) Utah

in this matter

Code Annotated

(1953 as

amended).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal arises from a judgment entered by the
Honorable J. Philip Eves, District Judge, sitting in the Fifth
Judicial District Court in Washington County, where Appellants
sought removal of Respondents1 buildings and user alleged to
encroach on Appellants' property. The trial judge, however, found
that Respondents Zane had met the doctrines of both boundary by
acquiescence and profit a prendre, appropriately vesting title in
them.

Limiting that doctrinefs application, however, the trial

fashioned a legal remedy for Appellants, as to the encroachment of

1

Respondents McNeil, and entered judgment for Appellants in the sum
of $3,666.41.

See Appendix III.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Respondents believe that the following issues constitute
the appropriate scope of judicial review in the instant case:
I.

Appropriate standards of appellate review compel
affirmation of the trial courts judgment.

II.

The trial court properly applied the doctrine
of boundary by acquiescence.

III.

The doctrine of profit a prendre was correctly
applied in the instant case.

IV.

The trial court erred in failing to apply the
doctrine of adverse possession to both those
parecels visibly occupied under color of title
by the Zanes and the McNeils.

V.

The Appellants, on the basis of several
applicable doctrines, failed to establish
the necessary prerequisites to mandate removal
of Repondents* encroachments.

VI.

Point III of Appellants' brief, which
indicates that the trial court acted
arbitrarily in structuring its equitable
remedy for the McNeils to accommodate their
alleged encroachment, should be summarily
rej ected.

2

VII.

The trial court erred in considering
Appellants1 resurvey as disturbing the Santa
Clara River as the north/south boundary
between Lots 6 and 7 and Lots 12 and 13.

VIII.

The trial court erred in failing to interpret
and/or reform the nature of the language
appearing in the reservations.

IX.

The Supreme Court in the instant case may deem
it appropriate to award Respondents attorney's fees
for defending this appeal.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES
Where necessary/ Respondents shall cite to appropriate
constitutional and statutory provisions within the body of the
brief and shall quote the same, unless otherwise noted, in their
entirety.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

PREFACE

Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows
Respondents

to

separately

state

their

case,

assuming

their

"dissatisfaction with Appellants1 statement". In the instant case,
many of Appellants1 allegations not only lack citation to the
record, but, indeed, are overwhelmingly contrary to the weight of
the

evidence.

For

example,

page

5

of

Appellants1

brief

[hereinafter AB], states as follows:
Other than as stated, nothing appears in the
record to show occupation up to a visible line
marked
by
physical
landmarks
and
mutual
acquiescence in that visible line as the boundary

over a long period of time by adjoining owners.
While the Santa Clara River is claimed as the
boundary by acquiescence, there is nothing in the
record other than the existence of the river that
would indicate it to be a boundary line, either
physically on site or in the public records.
The recitation of facts herein shall overwhelmingly
substantiate, however, that there was customary occupation up to
the edge of the Santa Clara River by the parties and their
predecessors in interest, and that the Santa Clara River was
accepted as a boundary by them, by County officials, and by
reputation.

Furthermore, Respondent Dorothy Zane's testimony

clearly indicates customary usage of the area to the river's edge,
together with that of her predecessors in interest, for well over
twenty years.
Of secondary difficulty is Appellants1 implication, that
they were bona fide third-party purchasers.

(AB at 5)

It is, at

best, an interesting argument, but there are no judicial findings
or conclusions which support this specious proposition.
Appellants then state that neither party presented any
viable evidence as to the cost or damage that would be incurred in
removing any of the encroachments.

(AB at 6) Both the McNeils and

the Zanes, however, testified that removal of their homes would, in
all likelihood, destroy the same. In contrast thereto, Appellants
indicated that the portion of land upon which they claimed an
encroachment had only casual value to them.
Appellants1 counsel then claims that the trial court
arbitrarily located the boundaries at the centerline of the Santa
Clara River.

A colloquy between the trial judge and Appellants'

4

counsel, however, supporting such a resolution of the matter will
be extensively quoted in Respondents1 factual statement.
Ultimately, Appellants claim that there was no evidence
taken as to what portion of Plaintiff's real property was necessary
to accommodate the McNeil encroachment.

(AB at 7)

McNeils,

however, testified that the necessary user for any value to their
property extended to the edge of the Santa Clara River.
importantly, however, Appellants proffered

through

More

their own

surveyor an encroachment consisting of a certain specified number
of square feet which went to the river's edge.

This proffer, in

terms of the square feet of the encroachment, was accepted by
Respondents.

Now, on appeal, Appellants claim for the first time

that their proffer should be summarily rejected by this Court to
otherwise whittle down the encroachment.
Respondents request this Court's indulgence in reviewing
the following extensive factual statement.

Contravening the

central postulations of Appellants' brief, this statement of facts
shall be extensively referenced to the trial court record and
transcript.
B.
1.

FACTS

BROOKSIDE SUMMER ESTATES/ITS CONCEPT AND FORMATION
In the mid-1960's, Russell and Pat Walter acquired a

parcel of ground subsequently subdivided as Brookside Summer Homes.
See

Transcript

[hereinafter

T]

at

174-75.

Comprised

of

approximately 61 lots, the subdivision is exclusively rural in
nature, located approximately 2\ to 3 miles northeast of the town
5

of Veyo.

(T at 159, 183) The Walters' intent was to subdivide the

land from top to bottom following the course of the Santa Clara
River with lots on each side.

(T at 155, 159, 195, 198)

Mr. and

Mrs. Walter then used a previously prepared draft of Covenants and
Restrictions for the Brookside Ranch Estates and recorded and
applied the same to the Brookside Summer Homes, with a handwritten
notation on the bottom of that document

indicating that the

restrictions also applied to lots "Brookside Summer Estates". See
D10. Mr. Walter's familiarity with the subdivision is a given, as
he resided in a home adjoining Brookside from 1965 through 1988.
(T at 145, 162-63)
Being rural in nature, no one has constructed fences
which extend to the river, septic tanks require a 100-foot setback,
and all construction is subject to the subdivider's approval.

(T

at 255, 283, Dl)
Mr. and Mrs. Walter retained Jack R. Newville to survey
the

property

and

prepare

a

subdivision

plat.

(T at

162)

Consistent with the name "Brookside", Mr. Walter specifically
instructed Mr. Newville to plat the subdivision so that the lots
running northwesterly to southeasterly would be divided by the
centerline of the Santa Clara River.

(T at 14, 146-47)

As a

consequence of the meandering course of the Santa Clara River, the
north-south platted line between the lots also meanders.

(T at 7,

PI) Russell Walter testified that Newville physically set boundary
stakes away from the riverfs edge so that they wouldn't be washed
away by floodwater.

(T at 152)

In mid-1965, the Brookside Summer
6

Homes Subdivision plat, based on Newville's survey, was approved
and recorded in the office of the Washington County Recorder.
(Memorandum Decision [hereinafter MD] at R 190; T at 435)
The trial court's memorandum decision sets forth the
former sequence of events as follows:
Prior to survey, Mr. Walter instructed Mr.
Newville that he should lay out the subdivision,
insofar as possible, to make the Santa Clara River,
which traverses the property, the common boundary
between the lots on each side. It was Mr. Walter's
intention and design that the lots on both sides of
the river have title to the center line of the
river. After the subdivision map was completed, it
appeared that Mr. Walter's instructions had been
followed as there was a meandering border down the
center of the subdivision which Mr. Walters, and
everyone else, assumed followed the course of the
river. The location of the river did not appear on
the subdivision plat.
The Appellants' own surveyor, Mr. Whitehead, testified
that PI had, indeed, been mistakenly platted in that Newville's
reference to the center section line and his tie from that center
section line are different than the actual ties that presently
exist

according

to official

government

surveys.

(T at 65)

Comparing PI to the recently reestablished governmental survey,
Newville's ties were off north and south 48 feet and east and west
approximately 100 feet. See T at 67-71, 82. Appellants' surveyor
concluded his testimony by indicating that by reason of Newville's
mistakes, Pi's center line boundary between Lots 12 and 13 and
Lots 6 and 7 could not have been the Santa Clara River.
82-83.

PI, the official

county plat,

did

not

accurately the road that accessed the subdivision.

7

See T at

even depict

(T at 435) The

trial court judge commented on this surveying error, which runs
throughout the entire subdivision, as follows:
That leaves begging, of course, the question of
whether or not if the survey had been done
correctly, there would be any encroachment at all.
(T at 72)
Mr. Walter then proceeded to sell the Brookside lots to
various buyers. As they were sold . . .
he informed each buyer whose lot appeared to abut
the river that they were in fact acquiring title to
the center line of the river and nothing on the
other side of the river.
This was based on
Mr. Walter's assumption that his instructions to
Mr. Newville had been followed. (MD at 191; T at
152)
Indeed, Walter testified that he both told and showed each buyer
that the river was their lot line, displaying Newville's stakes
approximately fifteen feet from the edge "of the creek".
152,

163, 438)

As to Appellants' Lots

12 and

(T at

13, Walter

specifically testified that they had been laid out bordering the
Santa Clara River.

(T at 201)

The trial court also accepted Mr.

Walter's testimony as follows:
As Mr. Walter sold the lots in his subdivision to
various buyers he informed each buyer whose lot
appeared to abut the river that they were in fact
acquiring title to the center line of the river and
nothing on the other side of the river.
(MD at
191; see also T at 198)
2.

DEED RESERVATIONS

To further bolster the buyer's knowledge of boundaries
Walter inserted a reservation in all but two deeds issued in the
Brookside Summer Homes Subdivision.

This reservation was to

guarantee "that even if the course of the river changed the
8

boundary line between the lots would change with it." The language
of the reservation conveyed the property "less any part crossing
the Santa Clara River", so that no lot would bridge or cross over
the river.

(MD at 191-92; T at 159-60)

Lots 6, 7 and 13, which

comprised a portion of the lawsuit, all contained this reservation
in their chain of title.

(T at 16) Lot 12 was one of two lots in

the subdivision from which the reservation was mistakenly omitted.
Walter testified that he was not going to sell Lot 12 at all,
because it lacked usable ground for building. Nonetheless, Walter
finally sold Lot 12 to the original owner of adjoining Lot 13. See
T at 202.
Subsection 20 of Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
allows receipt of reputation testimony concerning boundaries.

In

the instant case, the trial court clearly found, by a plethora of
evidence that
[p]laintiffsf and the defendants1 predecessors in
interest purchased their lots with the clear
understanding that the centerline of the river was
the boundary. The subdivider and the County Tax
Assessor also have believed that such was the case
and and [sic] have so represented the situation to
the property owners.
(MD at 198; see also T at
167, 197-98, 252, 282, 292)
This legal conclusion is amply supported by the record.

Beyond

reputation and usage, even Blair Mitchell, Appellants' title agent,
conceded homeowner use in Brookside up to the river's edge.
43)

(T at

Appellants' surveyor, Mr. Whitehead testified similarly, as

did Mr. Arnold, the President of Brookside Homeowners' Association,
who provided a portion of the testimony as to reputation.

9

3.

OCCUPATION AND USE BY DEFENDANTS

The Zane's predecessors in interest, Chester and Marion
Karr, purchased Lot 7 and began constructing their home in mid or
late 1966 or early 1967.

(T at 150)

The Washington County

Assessor first noted the home on the tax rolls in May of 1968. (T
at 113)

Mr. Walter sold on contract, and deeds were not recorded

until they were fully paid off.
preceded recordation.

(T at 146)

Thus, home completion regularly
Shortly after the Karrs built

their home, the Myers, who were the McNeil's predecessors in
interest, placed a mobile home on Lot 6, improving the property as
the Karrs had, all the way to the river.

(T at 153-157)

Despite

Walter's testimony as to when the Myers moved onto the property,
the Court felt uncertain as to a twenty-year occupation of Lot 6 on
behalf of the McNeils.

In all other respects, however, the trial

court felt that both the occupation and usage of the Zane's and
their predecessors in interest for well over twenty years prior to
the filing of suit, and by the McNeils and their predecessors in
interest for at least nineteen years prior to the filing suit was
open, notorious, exclusive, and consistent with the ownership
rights which would customarily be exercised by lot owners in the
subdivision.

The trial court's language follows:

In the first year or so after the subdivision
was recorded, Mr. Walter sold Lot 7 to Mr. and Mrs.
Karr on a Real Estate Sales Contract. The Karrs
immediately took possession and began building a
house on the lot which was completed by the end of
1967 or the beginning of 1968. In 1969, after the
real estate contract was paid off, Mr. Walter
recorded a warranty deed transferring title from
the Lucky 7 Rodeo Corporation to the Karrs. The
Karrs were told at the time that they purchased the
10

property that they owned the land up to the center
of the river and were actually taken to the
property and shown survey stakes by Mr. Walter
which he said evidenced that boundary. The Karrs
purchased the property after receiving those
representations.
Immediately after signing the
real estate contract the Karrs began using the land
to the river's edge for various recreational
pursuits, as a back yard, for access to the river
and for the maintenance of landscaping such as
grasses and trees. Some of the plants in the area
were natural and some imported and planted by the
Karrs. The area was kept groomed to the water's
edge. Mr. Walter observed this use and testified
that it continued for several years after the Karrs
took possession.
Within a short time after the Karrs bought
Lot 7, Mr. and Mrs. Glenn Myers bought Lot 6, also
on a land sales agreement.
They also took
possession of the property immediately and placed a
mobile home thereon.
The exact date that they
purchased the property or took possession was not
established by the evidence but the Karrs and the
Myers were among the first purchasers in the
subdivision.
Title to Lot 7 was transferred by
Warranty deed to the Myers in 1972 after they paid
off their land sales contract.
The county tax
records indicate a mobile home first appeared on
the property in the 1970 assessment.
The Myers
were also told by Mr. Walter when they purchased
that their land extended to the center line of the
river. Sometime after their purchase of the land,
the Myers began using the property to the water's
edge much in the same way as the karrs were doing.
The Court finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that Lots 6 and 7 were used much in the
same fashion through various owners thereafter to
the present title holders, Mr. and Mrs. Zane on
Lot 7 and Mr. and Mrs. McNeil on Lot 6, the
testimony of Mr. Santa Maria notwithstanding. The
Court's onsight [sic] inspection revealed that both
the Zanes and the McNeils continue to use the land
in the same ways as did their predecessors. (MD at
192-94)
The trial court's recitation is supported at T at 86, 88, 113, 14546, 150-51, 153-57, 189-94, 208-10, 212-27, 230-43, 246-49, 271-78,
285. Clearly, no one ever objected to the "Brookside" user of Lots
6 and 7, as these lots were believed to adjoin the river.
11

(T at

157) Thus, neither George Bennett, who initially purchased Lot 13,
nor the Wertz1, who subsequently owned both Lots 12 and 13, ever
disturbed that property which was north and west of the Santa Clara
River.

See Id.; see also T at 222. Even as of the date of trial,

nothing was developed on the other side of the river from where
Lots 6 and 7 were believed to be located.
4.

(T at 215)

THE ASSESSMENT AND TAXING SYSTEM

Respondents believe, in this one instance, that the trial
court failed to accurately assess the testimony of the Washington
County Assessor's office or the County Treasurer. The trial court
stated its findings in this rather cursory fashion:
The Washington County Assessor assumed that
the river was the boundary between Lots 5, 6 and 7
on one side and Lots 12 and 13 on the other but the
taxes were assessed not on the location of the
river but on the location of the property lines as
shown on the subdivision plat recorded in the
County Recorder's Office. The Court finds that no
taxes for Lots 12 and 13 were ever paid by the
owners of Lots 6 and 7. . . Both the Plaintiffs and
the Defendants' predecessors in interest purchased
their lots with the clear understanding that the
center line of the river was the boundary. The
subdivider and the County Tax Assessor also have
believed that such was the case and have so
represented the situation to the property owners.
(MD, T at 194, 198)
In point of fact, Clint Perkins, the County Assessor, testified
that the County Assessor's office considered the boundary line
between Lots 6 and 7, owned by the Respondents, and Lots 12 and 13,
owned by the Appellants, to be the Santa Clara River.

(T at 111)

The Assessor's office showed that Lots 6 and 7 had improvements on
them, and those improvements had been assessed solely to those
lots.

(T at 112) Never had any improvements been assessed to Lots
12

12 and 13.

Id.

To the Assessor's knowledge, no ground lying

northwesterly of the Santa Clara River was ever taxed to Lot 12 or
13.

(T at 113-115)

The appraiser working under Mr. Perkins also

advised him that the Santa Clara River was the dividing line
between Lots 6 and 7 and 12 and 13.

See T at 122, 129-30.

In an

affidavit which is part of the record on appeal, the County
Treasurer also indicated that all of the improvements had been
assessed to Lots 6 and 7 and that the Respondents Zane had been
paying on all of those assessments since 1969, with the McNeils
beginning in 1971.

(R 33-34; see also T at 210)

Mr. Perkins was subsequently recalled and again indicated
that procedures used in his office assessed land and improvements
on lots, which lots virtually appeared to border the Santa Clara
River.

(T at 295) He also indicated that the working plat used by

the County Treasurer's office has a different location of the river
from the plat before the Court (PI) , and that in all circumstances,
all of the improvements have been taxed to Lots 6 and 7.
299)

(T at 30,

Indeed, the following interchange was elicited on direct

examination:
Q: [By Mr. Hughes] In terms of your assessments,
have you assessed the property connected with the
residences to Lots 6 and 7 down to the edge of the
Santa Clara River.
A: [By Mr. Perkins] Yes. (T at 301, 7-10)
Orlow McKuen provided the Court with Defendant's Exhibit
11, a copy of which is now before the Court because the original
was multi-colored by Mr. McKuen, with the letters "H" marking the
location of each home in the subdivision.
13

See T at 306-07, 309.

McKuen had drawn a blue line down the center of Brookside Summer
Homes to represent where the Santa Clara River was located for
assessment purposes.

(T at 308)

To McKuen, it was obvious that

the boundary line was the Santa Clara River.

(T at 310)

As a

result, none of the improvements to the north and west of the Santa
Clara River were ever assessed to Lots 12 or 13.

(T at 311)

On

Dll, McKuen had placed the blue line as demarcating the Santa Clara
River by the jagged nature of that line with many angles showing
the flow of the river on the subdivision plat.

(T at 312)

This

was consistent with Russ Walter's testimony as to how he had
initially instructed the original surveyor to prepare the plat.
McKuen further testified that for assessment purposes, Lots 6, 7,
12 and 13 were all considered as bordering the Santa Clara River.
(T at 313) McKuen1s phrasing concerning the manner of assessments
was acutely relevant and material in the instant case:
[A]ny normal person that looks at it can see thatfs
were the river is. That's where the boundary line
is (meaning the river). (T at 319-20; see also T
at 327)
Edmund McAllister, who had been employed as an appraiser
by Washington County for approximately 9\
trial.

(T at 443)

years at the time of

He also testified that the assessor's office

assumed that the Santa Clara River functioned as a boundary to the
lots on both sides.

(T at 446) There is no testimony contrary to

that of Mr. Perkins, Mr. McKuen and Mr. McAllister.

For that

reason, Respondents, in their recitation of facts herein, must
argue

beyond

the

conclusions

of

the

trial

court.

Indeed,

Respondents believe that they adversely possessed their property
14

which Appellants now claim.

Furthermore, the trial court totally

missed the thrust of Justice Stewart's opinion in Bountiful v.
Riley. 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989), infra. Point VI.
5.

PLAINTIFF'S RESURVEY/PURCHASE

Appellants were sophisticated buyers.

They obtained an

offer and acceptance on Lots 12 and 13 of the Brookside Summer Home
Estates on July 1, 1988, with a closing scheduled on September 8,
1988.

(T at 366)

Mr. Englert testified that he had unlimited

licenses in all the general engineering areas; furthermore, he had
been involved in buying probably a hundred pieces of land over the
years.

(T at 367, 376)

Mrs. Englert testified that she had been

involved as a real estate agent and broker in Las Vegas since 1977,
subsequently working for Appellants' underwriter, First American
Title/ until June 30, 1988.

(T at 408)

Appellants' purchase was

specifically conditioned on a survey approved by them.

(T at 317,

387)
Well in advance of the scheduled closing, Appellants
retained Mr. Whitehead.

(T at 54)

The nature of the Whitehead

survey, prepared on August 1, 1988, its accuracy and limitations
were clearly testified to by Whitehead.

The document itself

indicates as follows:
The purpose of this survey was to retrace the
original survey as performed by Jack R. Newville,
Utah Certificate No. 2164, and to show the
relationship to the existing section lines. . .
(P3)
Whitehead testified that he had attempted to locate Lots 12 and 13
where Mr. Newville had originally located the lots but not in their
15

actual location.

(T at 65)

Additionally, Whitehead made no

attempt to independently determine the accurate location of Lots 6
and 7.
that

(T at 69, 73-74)

despite

Indeed, Whitehead specifically testified

substantial

errors

in the

original

purposely attempted to replicate those errors.

survey,

(T at 71)

P3
The

trial court commented thereon as follows:
That leaves begging, of course, the question of
whether or not if the survey had been done
correctly, there would be any encroachment at all.
(T at 72)
Succinctly stated, Whitehead reused Newville's inaccuracies from
the

official

government

survey

in drafting

P3.

(T at 78)

Whitehead then conceded the possibility of an overlap existing
between Lots 6 and 7 and Lots 12 and 13.

(T at 80)

Furthermore,

Whitehead testified that if Mr. Newville had been instructed to
make the boundary between Lots 12 and 13 and Lots 6 and 7 the Santa
Clara River, the initial survey on which Whitehead had based P3 was
entirely mistaken on this postulation as well.

(T at 82, PI, P3)

Whitehead advised Appellants that there were possible
encroachments on Lots 12 and 13 in August of 1988.

(T at 84-85)

Appellants1 title insurance policy also indicates the underwriters
trepidation.

(P2)

Schedule B, Section 1, point 4 indicated the

following exclusion from coverage:
Discrepancies, conflicts and boundary lines,
shortage in area, encroachments, or any other facts
which a correct survey would disclose, and which
are not shown by public records.
(P2, emphasis
added)
Section 2 of Schedule B added in points 8 and 9 the following two
exclusions:
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8.

9.

Any discrepancies in the boundaries and
dimensions of said land which could be
determined by an Accurate Resurvey of all said
subdivision, and our subject property.
The apparent encroachment of the existing
house and outbuildings or other structures,
onto property adjacent to our subject
property, as disclosed by a survey of subject
property.

Concededly, the words "Accurate Resurvey" were even capitalized by
the underwriter.

(D2; see also R 99-100)

Despite the foregoing,

Mr. Englert, without indicating any possible discrepancies to his
seller, Mrs. Wertz, who had been recently widowed, purchased the
property.

(T at 389, 392; see also D12)
Regarding Plaintiff's purchase of the ground, the trial

court succinctly noted as follows:

"The Plaintiffs were aware of

the boundary dispute when they purchased Lots 12 and 13."

(R at

198)
The trial court was apparently not concerned with the
obvious frailties of Whitehead's survey, and based a substantial
portion of its ultimate ruling upon the assumption that P3 was
accurate.
When these Plaintiffs commissioned the 1988
re-survey of Lots 12 and 13, which lots they
intended to acquire from one Dorothy Wirtz, they
discovered that the survey did not follow the river
as the boundary between Lots 12 and 13 on one the
hand [sic], and Lots 5, 6 and 7 on the other.
Indeed the re-survey showed that the Santa Clara
River runs through Lots 12 and 13 and Lots 6 and 7
do not abut the river at all. In addition, the resurvey showed that the homes on Lots 6 and 7 were
actually situated astride the property boundaries.
The home built by Karrs on Lot 7 and now occupied
by the Zanes is actually partially on Lot 7 and
partially on Lot 12. The home (mobile home with a
permanent and fixed addition) placed by Myers and
now occupied by McNeils, is partially on Lot 6,
17

partly on Lot 12, and party
(R 184-85)
6.

[sic] on Lot 13.

SUIT

Appellants filed suit on May 2, 1989, alleging that
Respondents' homes encroached upon Appellants' resurveyed lot
lines.

(R at 1; T at 10)

Appellants' complaint sought only

equitable relief, that is, removal of the so-called encroaching
homes, and attorney's fees.

(R at 3; T at 10) Before 1989, no one

had ever challenged the properties' boundary as bordering the Santa
Clara River.

Indeed, no person, other than Appellants, have ever

claimed their property went on both sides of the river.

(T 258)

At the conclusion of trial, a colloquy between Plaintiff's counsel
and the trial court recognized the broad discretion of that Court,
which had additionally conducted an on-site view, to not only deny
equitable relief, but to recommend, indeed, affirmative equitable
relief to possibly resolve the encroachment, in terms of legal
damages•
THE COURT:
All right.
So you're saying if I
determine there is an encroachment, and none of
Mr. Hughes' defenses,
in terms
of
adverse
possession or profit a prendre apply, that I simply
ought to do the mathematics and determine what
damages you get, depending on how big a piece of
property they get—the people who built the houses
on Lots 12 and 13 get to keep? is that what you're
saying?
MR. FOREMASTER: Well, our—yes. In effect, our
preference is you make them move the encroachments.
THE COURT: Well, I'm sure you realize I'm highly
unlikely to do that.
We've got 80 an $85,000
houses, and we've got two lots that cost 22,900 in
total, a large portion of which will still be left
even if the encroachments remain.
In weighing
those equities, obviously I'm going to come down in
favor of not removing the houses.
MR. FOREMASTER: I've been assuming that.
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THE COURT: Okay.
MR. FOREMASTER:
So assuming that assumption is
correct, then I think under the law, that it would
be the Court's responsibility to determine the size
of the encroachment and the amount of the damage.
That's as I see it. (T 451-52)
7.

ENCROACHMENT ANALYSIS/COMPARABLE EQUITIES

In analyzing the various encroachments and equitable
positions of the parties, the trial court's memorandum decision,
with some commentary/ is telling:
The Plaintiffs testified that in their opinion
the property north and west of the Santa Clara
River had a value of fifty cents per square foot.
They also testified that if the Defendants were
allowed to take a portion of the property north and
west of the Santa Clara River from Lots 12 and 13,
any portion remaining on that side of the river
would be reduced in value by one-half. See T at
379-81. On the other hand, Mr. Walter testified on
the basis of his expertise regarding values in the
subdivision and real property generally in that
area of Washington County that land values have
decreased about 20 per cent [sic] since the
Plaintiffs bought Lots 12 and 13 from Mrs. Wirtz at
a total price of $22,900.00 for both lots. See T
at 186. That purchase price equates to 25 cents
per square foot.
Actually, Appellants' purchase price technically worked out to
23.467 cents per square foot. (T at 387) Furthermore, Mr. Englert
conceded that both Lots 12 and 13 needed substantial additional
elevation and fill, and the Court's on-site review revealed sheer
cliffs abutting the rear.
The

Court continued

its analysis by

examining

the

potential cost of relocating the encroaching structures, and indeed
changing the parties' prior user:
It also appears that if the encroaching
structures are moved they would be destroyed, or
severely damages and that those structures are
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valued at $80,000•00 to $85,000.00 each.
These
structures appear to have been in place for less
than 20 years in the case of the McNeils and over
20 years in the case of the Zanes prior to the
filing of this lawsuit.
(R at 196-97; see T at
209, 211, 227-28)
The Court thereafter stated as follows:
As the subdivision was actually laid out the
river would run through Lots 12 and 13 and divide
those lots. That would leave small parcels of Lots
12 and 13 to the north and west of the river which
would not be suitable for construction of
residences and which would not be accessable [sic]
from the main portion of those lots without
construction of a bridge at considerable expense in
view of the fact that the river often rises
dramatically during the runoff season. See T at
86.
The
Plaintiffs
have
not
undertaken
construction of improvements on Lots 12 and 13 and
there remains on the southeast side of the river
sufficient area for the Plaintiffs to construct a
residence as they testified they desired to do.
(R at 197-98)
Clearly, the Court had great discretion in balancing the
equities in the instant case.

On pages 449-50 of the transcript,

the following exchange occurs between Plaintiff's counsel and the
Court:
MR. FOREMASTER:
. . . The encroachments—here
again, it was a little bit difficult for us to put
a value before you on the loss for the
encroachment, because we didn't know just what size
of encroachment you'd find. Hence the use of the
square footage figure rather than an overall
balance or overall figure.
THE COURT: I understand.
MR. FOREMASTER: So that I would think that if you
decide that the legal remedies should be applied,
then a determination would have to be made as to
the size of whatever encroachments you're going to
receive, whether it goes to the—whether it goes to
just where the homes sit, or whether you go back to
the legal setback as provided by the zoning in
place at the time, or whether you go to the
testimony of Mr. Santamaria or some other witness
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as to footage back from the house. Whatever vou
find is appropriate. And I—of course I think it's
a simple matter to take the figures given and
calculate out what the damage would be.
Id. ,
emphasis added.
Regarding values, Appellants' counsel ultimately conceded that that
also was within the prerogative of the trier of fact.

(T at 450)

Once again, at pages 450-51, the Court and Appellants' attorney
engage in the following exchange:
MR. FOREMASTER: . . . property owners are entitled
to give their opinion as to values of their
property, which is an exception to the general rule
regarding expert appraisers or experts.
And I
think that was a correct statement of the law.
I would say that these—both the plaintiffs
are unusual property owners in the sense that they
both dealt in real estate before. Mrs. Englert has
been involved in—as a broker—or as a salesperson,
at least, and as a title person. So I think that
my clients' opinions as to value and the value of
damage probably, in our opinion, at least, would
bear more study and consideration than—than a
property—an average property owner.
I think their opinion is every bit as good as
Mr. Walter. He possesses no more expertise that I
hear than my clients do. But I'm just going to
have to let you judge it as you see it, because
it's up to the trier of fact to make that
formulation.
Now, I don't think—I'd rather, with your
permission, not argue the facets of Mr.—
THE COURT: I understand.
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court condensed its ruling,
foreshadowed in part by the colloquy above, as follows:
The Court is of the opinion that the
Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law since
their loss can be compensated by assessment of
damages in their favor if in fact they are entitled
to any legal remedy at all. Assessing damages and
allowing the encroachments to remain will not
destroy or significantly hinder the intended use
and enjoyment of the property contemplated by the
Plaintiffs. (R at 198)
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In analyzing Respondents' defenses, the trial court first
found that the Zanes and their predecessors

in interest had

established boundary by acquiescence to the river's edge, and were
that not the case, a prescriptive easement had otherwise ripened.
See MD, R at 200-05, 206-07.
8.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING

The Court found the evidence on user, however, did not
extend for the full twenty years on behalf of the McNeils.

The

Court, however, having surprisedly rejected the adverse possession
argument

on

behalf

of

the

Zanes,

obviously

held

the

same

unavailable to protect the McNeils. At trial, Appellants' attorney
proffered through Mr. Whitehead, Appellants' engineer, the square
footage of the encroachments extending all the way to the river.
No other square footages, setback, or zoning requirements were
offered to the Court.

(T at 135-40)

It was found that the McNeil

residence and usage encroached 5,401.84 square feet on one lot,
said encroachment being denominated by the surveyor and counsel as
Parcel B, and that the McNeil parcel encroached on the other lot
7,396.42 square feet, the same being denominated by both counsel
and Mr. Whitehead as Parcel C. Id. These were the only figures in
Appellants' proffer, which proffer was accepted by Respondents. Id.
The Court's ruling, which in effect provided a legal remedy to
Appellants, is summarized as follows:
Upon stipulation, the parties agreed that
parcel B contains 5,401.84 square feet and parcel C
contains 7,396.42 square feet. The total of those
parcels is therefore 12, 798.26 square feet, which
the Court will round down to 12,798.00. Plaintiffs
purchased Lots 12 and 13 together at a total cost
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of $22,900.00, or about 25 cents per square foot.
Plaintiffs contend that the property has doubled in
value and cite as proof certain "comparable sales"
in the area. The Court can accord no weight to
those "comparable sales" since Plaintiffs candidly
admitted they had never seen those properties and
had no idea how they actually compared to the
property in dispute, including whether they had
been improved. See T at 387-89, 414, 421.
On the other hand Defendants offered the
testimony of Mr. Walter who opined that the value
of B.S.H.S. property has declined 20 percent since
the Plaintiffs purchase in 1988. No supporting
evidence was offered for Mr. Walter's opinion. See
T at 205, 427-32.
The Court finds that the best indicator of the
value of the property is the amount Plaintiff's
[sic] paid when they purchased in 1988, or 25 cents
per square foot. (MD at R 208-09)
It could not be gainsaid that Mrs. Englert had indicated that the
only usable value on the Zane and McNeil side of their lots was for
quiet enjoyment, and not for construction.

(T at 421)

Thus, as a result, the trial court allowed the Zanes to
peacefully continue possessing their property, and awarded the
Plaintiff a judgment against the McNeils for $3,199.50, plus
interest from the date of filing suit to the date of trial at ten
percent, the entire amount to bear interest at the judgment rate
from and after October 26th until paid in full.
9.

(MD at 209)

APPEAL

Appellants now seek to restrict the trial court's legal
remedy, apparently seeking appellate recalculation by divination of
the amount of the encroachment.
reversal

of

the

trial

courtfs

Furthermore, Appellants seek
application

of

boundary

acquiescence and profit a prendre in the instant case.
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by

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THE STANDARD OP REVIEW UNDER UTAH LAW PROVIDES THAT A TRIAL
COURT'S FINDINGS SHALL NOT BE SET ASIDE UNLESS CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS
In

light

of the

foregoing,

and

the trial

court's

exclusive prerogative to weigh the witnesses, it is clear that a
substantial amount of evidence supports the trial court's ruling.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY
BY ACQUIESCENCE
In the instant case, the trial court adopted the Santa

Clara River as an appropriate monument to which the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence could apply.

The other elements as

established by Utah decisional authority amply supports the trial
court's decision.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF PROFIT A PRENDRE WAS CORRECTLY APPLIED IN THE
INSTANT CASE
The evidence vastly supported the application of this
doctrine to the Zanes, who with their predecessors in interest, had
occupied their home with customary usage to the edge of the river
at least twenty-one years prior to Appellants' filing of suit.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD THAT BOTH RESPONDENT FAMILIES
HAD ADVERSELY POSSESSED LOTS 6 AND 7 OF BROOKS IDE SUMMER HOMES
SUBDIVISION
Evidence from both the County Assessor's office and the

County Treasurer's office support this conclusion, which departs
from Utah case law as illustrated by Affleck v. Morgan. 12 Utah 2d
200, 364 P.2d 663 (Utah 1961).
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V.

THE APPELLANTS, ON THE BASIS OF SEVERAL APPLICABLE EQUITABLE
DOCTRINES, FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE NECESSARY PREREQUISITES TO
MANDATE REMOVAL OF RESPONDENTS1 ENCROACHMENTS.
The record supports that Appellants are not bona fide

purchasers of the property, nor does a balancing of equities
support removal of Respondents' encroachments, so that Appellants
might have casual enjoyment of the property.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY IN STRUCTURING ITS
REMEDY FOR BOTH APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS IN THE INSTANT
CASE.
Balancing the equities therein, and based on the evidence

proffered by Appellants and received upon Respondents' stipulation,
the trial court's actions were well-reasoned and not arbitrary.
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING APPELLANTS1 RESURVEY AS
DISTURBING THE SANTA CLARA RIVER AS THE NORTH/SOUTH BOUNDARY
LINE BETWEEN LOTS IN THE BROOKSIDE SUMMER HOMES SUBDIVISION.
Clearly, a recent survey taken some twenty-three years
after the creation of the subdivision should not be employed to
disturb lot lines long adhered to and recognized by both the
community and the county as being accurate.
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INTERPRET AND/OR REFORM
THE NATURE OF THE LANGUAGE APPEARING IN THE DEED
REFORMATIONS.
The trial court is clearly imbued with the power of
reformation, and here the facts amply supported its application.
IX.

THE SUPREME COURT IN THE INSTANT CASE MAY DEEM IT APPROPRIATE
TO AWARD RESPONDENTS ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR DEFENDING THIS
APPEAL.
Under Title 78 of the Utah Code, Respondents are entitled

to attorney's fees in the event an appeal, based on the law and
facts of the case, appears frivolous in nature.
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Respondents

suggest that it is within this Courtfs discretion to consider an
award of attorneys fees to them on appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OP APPELLATE REVIEW COMPEL
AFFIRMATION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT
Prior to July 1, 1985, Article 8, § 9 of the Utah

Constitution specifically set forth a greater standard of review in
equitable cases.

See e.g. . Reed v. Alvev. 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah

1980); Bown v. Loveland. 678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1984).

Under this

standard, the Appellate court could not reverse the trial court
judgment unless the evidence in the case clearly preponderated
against its findings.

In Adams v. Gubler. 731 P.2d 494 (Utah

1986), however, Justice Durham, speaking for a unanimous Utah
Supreme Court, noted that even though the former constitutional
section had been redrafted, Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P., which became
effective January 1, 1987, provides that findings of fact "shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous."

Id. at 496, n. 3.

This standard applied regardless of whether the case is one in
equity or one in law.

See Barker v. Francis. 741 P.2d 548 (Utah

App. 1987); see also. Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58 (Utah 1987).
Most recently, in Judd Family Limited Partnership v. Hutchings, 797
P. 2d 1088 (Utah 1990), Justice Howe stated the applicable standard
as follows:
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, forbids
us from setting aside factual findings unless
clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses. We find nothing in
the trial court's findings of fact which would
suggest that they are erroneous, let alone "clearly
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erroneous." In Scharf v. BMG Corp. , 700 P.2d 1068,
1070 (Utah 1985) , we stated that we would not
overturn a finding of fact without first marshaling
[sic) all the evidence supporting the finding and
then demonstrating that when viewed in the light
most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is
clearly insufficient to support that finding. Id.
at 9.
The second portion of Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. indicates that
due regard "shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses." As before indicated, the
trial court in the instant case was able to hear the testimony and
judge each witness1 credibility. It was able to weigh any conflict
in that testimony, and by reason of an on-site view of the property
conducted during the trial, the trial court could, without advocacy
from either party, form a judicial and unbiased conclusion as to
the equities in the instant case.

The trial court's memorandum

decision, and the findings of fact which parallel the same, are
supported by a plethora of evidence in the record.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERTY APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE
Appellants

apparently

contend

that the doctrine of

boundary by acquiescence is inapplicable because a river cannot
create a visible line to which an adjoining property owner can
acquiesce to as a boundary line.

(AB at 5)

Secondly, Appellants

spuriously assert the following:
There is absolutely nothing in the record that
supports the contention of the Defendants Zane that
they or their predecessors occupied the subject
land up to the center of the Santa Clara River for
the necessary length of time. (AB at 11)
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In reply,

it should be noted that the trial court

initially concluded that the Santa Clara River was non-navigable.
(T at 278-82)

As such, occupation to the river's edge, absent

other intended reservations, would allow the riparian landowners
ownership to the centerline of the river. See 93 C.J.S. "Waters",
§ 71 at pp. 745-46. Indeed, the Colorado case of Moore v. Johnson.
568 P.2d 437 (Colorado 1977) states the general rule as follows:
The general rule of law . . . is that a deed
conveying land bordered by a non-navigable stream
includes the bed to the center or thread of the
stream if the stream is described as a boundary or
monument. . . whether the rule prevails in a given
case is to be determined by consideration of the
language used and the surrounding circumstances
which are proffered and may be considered to
ascertain the intention of the parties. 568 P.2d
437 at 439. (citations omitted)
In the instant case, it was clearly the intent of the
subdivider to convey, at the very least, to the edge of the river,
if indeed not to the middle thereof.

Furthermore, it was clearly

established by the evidence that the Zanes, as well as the McNeils
and

their

predecessors

in

interest,

had

occupied

the

land

consistent with customary ownership to the edge of the river.

In

the Zane's case, such occupation and usage clearly exceeded twenty
years.

In

the

McNeil's

case,

the

evidence

was

somewhat

contradictory, but established a clear usage of approximately
nineteen years at the time Appellants filed suit.
The trial court, having heard the testimony of the
parties,

and

giving

particular

weight

to

the

testimony

of

Mr. Walter, together with that of disinterested nonparties, such as
Wes Arnold, found clear occupation of the property to the river's
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edge on behalf of both parties.

To attack these findings,

Appellants must somehow successfully assert that they are "clearly
erroneous" under applicable standards of appellate review.

Not

only are the same not clearly erroneous, they are fully supported
by the evidence.
Utah courts have long recognized the doctrine of boundary
by acquiescence.

At times, however, the doctrine appears to have

mistakenly merged with the doctrine of boundary by agreement. See.
e.g. , Halladav

v.

Cluff,

685 P.2d

500 at

503

(Utah

1984).

Recently, the Halladay opinion has been modified by the case of
Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990).

Indeed, Staker

reversed the Halladay case's requirement that there be "objective
uncertainty as to the real location of the boundaries". The Staker
case now presents
applicability:

(1)

four elements requisite to the doctrine's
occupation up to a visible line marked by

monuments, fences or buildings, (2) mutual acquiescence in the line
as a boundary, (3) for a long period of time, (4) by adjoining
landowners.

Id. at 26.

The trial court, in its memorandum decision, correctly
addressed the thrust of the Staker decision.

(R at 200) The trial

court then struggled with the issue of whether a river could
otherwise

constitute a sufficient monument

of a boundary to

establish the above elements. The court, with numerous citation to
sister states, as well as C.J.S., resolved the issue in favor of
Respondents.

(R at 201)
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Though the trial court indicated that its review of Utah
case law did not indicate whether a river constitutes a sufficient
monument, it is clear that the trial court struggled with the
economies of time and the research otherwise placed before it by
counsel.

A thorough research of Utah law, however, supports the

trial judge's reasoned conclusions.

For example, in the case of

Olsen v. Park Daughters' Investment Company, 29 Utah 2d. 421, 511
P.2d 145 (Utah 1973) , the Utah Supreme Court considered whether the
Provo River could constitute a visible monument for the application
of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.

In Olsen. the area

over which the disputed boundaries arose was commonly referred to
as "the river bottoms".

See 29 Utah 2d. 421 at 423.

Justice

Crockett, writing for a unanimous Utah Supreme Court, applied the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, thus quieting title to the
Defendants to the edge of that river. Id. at 425. In applying the
doctrine, the Utah Supreme Court in Olsen states as follows:
It is for this reason that it has seemed sound
policy that boundary lines which have been long
established and accepted by those who should be
concerned should be left undisturbed in order to
leave at rest matters which may have resulted in
controversy and litigation, wherefore there has
developed a doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
Its essence is that where there arises a dispute as
to the boundary between properties and it appears
that there is a recognizable physical boundary of
any character, which has been acquiesced and is a
boundary for a long period of time, the conflict
should be conclusively presumed to have been
reconciled in some manner. It is our opinion that
the policy of encouraging peace and good order and
of discouraging trouble and controversy demands
that that be accepted as the correct doctrine, and
that it need not depend upon rationalization as to
ideas of estoppel, presumed agreements, lost rents
or other fictional concepts.
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The trial court's ruling below, applying the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence to the Zanes, is decidedly well-reasoned.
Appellants believe, however, that the last sentence on page 16 of
the memorandum decision unduly emphasizes the court's failure to
find the evidence sufficient to establish the period of twenty
years occupation on behalf of the McNeils and their predecessors in
interest.
requires

(R at 204)
twenty

While boundary by acquiescence normally

years

occupation,

there

have

been

repeated

suggestions by the Utah Supreme Court that indicate that unusual
circumstances may exist that make the application of the doctrine
equitable, even where the occupation might have been for a lesser
period of time.

See e.g. . Wood v. Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255 at 1258

(Utah 1984); Hobson v. Panouitch Lake Corporation, 530 P.2d 792 at
795 (Utah 1975); King v. Fronk. 14 Utah 2d 135 at 141-2, 378 P.2d
893, 897 (Utah 1963).

In the instant case, as has been previously

factually established, both the reputation for the boundaries in
the area, and the intent of the subdivider was to establish the
river as a line of boundary or demarcation. The Respondents McNeil
and their predecessors in interest did so for a period of not less
than 19 years at the time Appellants filed suit.

Indeed, when the

Appellants filed suit, their surveyor had already advised them of
the potential encroachments; consequently, Appellants are not bona
fide purchasers.

Infra at V (C). Furthermore, the title insurer

begged off underwriting over Respondents1 obvious occupation of the
property by numerous exceptions in the title policy.

Appellants

conceded that they had made their purchase subject to an approved
31

survey, and could have backed out. Instead, Appellants proceeded,
first by purchasing the property, and then by seeking to oust
Respondents and their "encroachments" from Appellants1 property,
platted on the basis of an erroneous resurvey.
inroad

can

be

equitably

created

reducing

Clearly, if an
the

twenty-year

requirement by one year, then this case mandates its reduction.
Respondents urge this Court not only to affirm the application of
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence as to the Zanes, but to
further apply the same to the McNeils.

It is respectfully

submitted

as to boundary by

that the trial court's opinion

acquiescence is unassailable, but should be extended to protect
Respondents McNeil.
III.

THE DOCTRINE OP PROFIT A PRENDRE WAS CORRECTLY
APPLIED IN THE INSTANT CASE

The

trial

court's

memorandum

decision

awarding

a

prescriptive easement in favor of the Zanes is found at R 206-207.
Succinctly stated, the trial court correctly applied that doctrine
in finding a prescriptive easement in favor of the Zanes.

See

Anderson v. Osouthorpe, 504 P.2d 1000 (Utah 1972). Ample evidence
in the record cited in Respondent's factual statement fairly
supports the trial court's conclusion.
Respondent's counsel's review of Utah law does not
support any suggestion that any period less than twenty years might
be allowed.
arisen

in

To the same extent, however, that inferences have
the

application

of

the

doctrine

of

boundary

by

acquiescence to suggest that a period of time somewhat less than
twenty

years

might

be

available
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under

particular

equitable

circumstances, Respondents

urge that

this

court may,

as an

alternative form of relief to the McNeils, relax this requirement
to create a prescriptive easement on their behalf.

The trial

court, bound by the doctrines of stare decisis, held that as the
McNeils could only show occupation for nineteen years, they were
not entitled to the easements otherwise supported by Utah law as
represented by the Oscruthorpe case. Equity may, however, compel a
slight moderation of the doctrine herein.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE DOCTRINE OF
ADVERSE POSSESSION TO BOTH THOSE PARCELS VISIBLY
OCCUPIED UNDER COLOR OF TITLE BY THE
ZANES AND THE MCNEILS
The Brookside Summer Homes Subdivision was a rural

subdivision.

It is further established that there is no clear

evidence before the Court as to where the Defendants Zane or
McNeil's lots, to-wit, Lots 6 and 7, are accurately located.
Reputation testimony, however, received at trial, coupled with the
testimony of the parties and the on-site view of the trial court
resulted in several findings pertaining to the usage of the ground,
as is recorded in the court's memorandum decision at R 192-94.
Clearly, for the trial court to have found a prescriptive easement,
and indeed, boundary by acquiescence on behalf of the Zanes, he was
finding that the usage of the property to the river's edge was
within the ordinary use of occupants appropriate to the location
and character of the property. See e.g. , D a w Steele 184 P.2d 216
(Utah 1947).

Furthermore, the trial court found that the McNeils,

though not entitled to these defenses had, for a period of
approximately nineteen years, together with their predecessors in
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interest, maintained and cultivated the ground in a manner and form
substantially

similar

to

that

of

the

Zanes.

(R

at

194)

Section 78-12-9 of the Utah Code states that where title
is founded on a written instrument, land is deemed to have been
possessed and occupied for purposes of adverse possession in the
following cases:
(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or
improved.
(2) Where it has been protected by a
substantial enclosure. (3) . . . (4) Where a known
farm or single lot has been partly improved, the
portion of such farm or lot that may have been left
not cleared or not enclosed according to the usual
course and custom of the adjoining county is deemed
to have been occupied for the same length of time
as the part improved and cultivated.
Viewing the above statutory language, it is clear that both the
Zanes and the McNeils occupied to the riverfs edge, claiming title
under written instruments, to-wit, their deeds to Lots 6 and 7 of
the Brookside Summer Homes Subdivision.

Furthermore, though the

trial court found that the taxes were assessed on the basis of the
property lines, as shown on the subdivision plat, and not on the
basis of the location of the river, this conclusion is expressly
contravened by the County Assessor, County Treasurer and two
appraisers

retained by the County Assessor's

office.

These

witnesses all testified that the practice in Washington County was
to assess the improvements and values of the property in Brookside
to the river's edge.

Supra at 10, 13.

Both the Zanes, the McNeils and their predecessors in
interest, apparently in ignorance of the actual boundaries, which
as of the date

of this brief have never been
34

established,

nonetheless took and held possession by mistake up to a certain
line, over a period of time well beyond that required by adverse
possession in the State of Utah.

It was their intent to claim

title, and indeed they did so, despite the fact that Mr. Walter's
instructions to Mr. Newville to draw the boundary lines between the
lots based upon the course of the Santa Clara River was not
correctly followed.

See Findings of Fact 4 and 5; R at 261.

In

light of this, Respondents respectfully assert that the following
language

from

3 Am. Jur. 2d,

"Adverse

Possession",

§ 58 is

literally on all fours with the their case:
It is a widely accepted rule that where a
landowner, in ignorance of actual boundaries, takes
and holds possession by mistake up to a certain
line beyond boundary limits, on the claim and in
the belief that it is the true line, with the
intention to claim title, and if necessary to
acquire title by possession up to that line, such
possession, having the requisite duration and
continuity, will ripen into title. Thus, the mere
fact that the possession originated in a mistake or
in ignorance as to the location of the true
boundary line will not prevent the running of the
statute of limitations, for if the person in
possession intends to claim the land to the line
occupied and possession of it is open and exclusive
for the statutory period, such possession will be
held to be hostile and to vest the title in the
claimant under the statute, even though the land
was not inclosed. If the occupant of the disputed
area is under a mistaken belief that it is included
in the description of the deed—a state of mind
sometimes described as pure mistake to distinguish
it from the cases of conscious doubt—then the
possession is hostile.
The Utah case of Affleck v. Morgan. 12 Utah 2d 200, 364
P.2d 663 (Utah 1961) is illustrative, and parallels in large part
the

factual

setting

of the

instant

case.

In Affleck, the

Plaintiffs filed an action to quiet title for land and for trespass
35

thereon, basing their claim on the fact that a new survey revealed
that the Plaintiff's northern boundary was twenty-two feet north of
an old line that had been established for many years.

The lower

court found for the Plaintiffs, granting the Defendant some limited
easement rights.

On appeal, however, Justice Callister, speaking

for a unanimous Utah Supreme Court, reversed, and found that the
Defendants were entitled to disregard the resurvey and consider it
as having no effect on the ownership of their property.

The basis

of the decision was founded in adverse possession, by reason of the
fact that the improvements, though technically located on the
Plaintiff's real property, had been taxed and assessed by the
Assessor's office, and said taxes had been paid by the Defendants
throughout the period of adverse possession. The Court's language,
found at 12 Utah 2d 205 is no less applicable today:
The defendants have paid taxes on the real
property bordered by the solid line, triangular
shaped, and designated as the "Morgan Property" on
the map. Although the tax notices describe the
"Morgan Property," the assessment was based upon
the improvements which are located on the strip of
land in dispute. Thus the amount assessed for the
improvements has been paid by the defendants even
though they (the improvements) were not in fact
located on the property described in the tax
notices.
Clearly, the Supreme Court in Affleck looked beyond the actual
resurveyed descriptions and rather considered the practical aspects
of the taxing and assessment system, which taxed the above-ground
improvements

as

if

they

had

been

appropriately

situate

on

Defendants' property. In Affleck, as in the instant case, evidence
suggested that the improvements may have been on the Plaintiff's
36

ground, but as in Affleck, the instant case also provides a
plethora of evidence that suggests that all the improvements and
all the benefit conferred to the ground all the way to the river's
edge abutting Lots 6 and 7 was taxed solely to the Zanes and the
McNeils and their predecessors in interest.

As in Affleck, this

Court should quiet title to the Zanes and McNeils, and remand the
case accordingly.
V.

A.

THE APPELLANTS, ON THE BASIS OF SEVERAL APPLICABLE
DOCTRINES, FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE NECESSARY
PREREQUISITES TO MANDATE REMOVAL OF
RESPONDENTS1 ENCROACHMENTS
THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE NECESSARY
PREREQUISITES FOR A MANDATORY INJUNCTION
Plaintiffs1 resurvey, commissioned in August of 1988,

was, according to Plaintiffs1 own surveyor, an incorrect survey.
Indeed, Mr. Whitehead testified that it was based upon the earlier
survey of Mr. Newville, which did not accurate plat the lots, as
depicted and described within the subdivision.

Furthermore,

Whitehead clarified that the survey did nothing to accurately
locate the position of Lots 6 and 7, and readily conceded the
possibility of there being an overlap between Lots 6 and 7 and Lots
12 and 13, if the survey had ever been properly platted.
Respondents suggest that, based upon the very frailty of
this evidence, that Appellants failed to sustain the burden
requisite to establish an appropriate boundary line
to a claim for ejectment.
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prerequisite

B.

THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY REJECTED PLAINTIFF'S
REQUEST FOR REMOVAL OF DEFENDANTS' ALLEGEDLY
ENCROACHING STRUCTURES
In every case where a Plaintiff seeks removal of a

structure allegedly encroaching upon its ground, courts must
balance the equities in determining whether the encroachment
should, indeed, be removed.

An overview of the applicable law,

particularly those factors determining whether removal would be
mandated, is found at Annotation, "Mandatory Injunction to Compel
Removal of Encroachments by Adjoining Landowner", 28 A.L.R. 2d 679.
Sister states are clearly in accord with the doctrine that equity
courts are not bound by rigid rules of common law, but may adapt
the relief requested to satisfy the requirement of the case, and to
protect and conserve the parties' varying interests.

See e.g. .

Malnar v. Whitfield, 774 P.2d 1075 (Okla. App. 1989); Garcia v.
Sanchez, 772 P.2d 1311 (New Mex. App. 1989).
That such a balancing procedure is employed by Utah
courts is evident from the 1936 Utah case, Mary Jane Stevens Co. v.
First National Building Co.. 57 P.2d 1099.

In Mary Jane Stevens.

the Utah Supreme Court held that in balancing the equities, the
encroaching party could be legally assessed damages to compensate
Plaintiff when the hardship or cost of removal was otherwise unduly
burdensome.

Similarly, in an early case of Lewis v. Pinaree

National Bank. 151 P. 558 (Utah 1915), the Utah Supreme Court also
held that the fact that an encroachment may constitute a public
nuisance does not necessarily compel its abatement. Indeed, all of
the cases suggest that the equities must always be balanced.
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C

APPELLANTS ARE NOT BONA FIDE PURCHASERS, AND, AS
SUCH, WERE NOT ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE RELIEF
Appellants contend on page 5 of their brief that there

was neither anything done nor of record "to put a bona fide third
party purchaser on notice" of Respondents1 claims pertaining to
their occupation of their homes to the river's edge.

By this

statement, Respondents assume that Appellants are characterizing
themselves as bona fide purchasers.

The term itself requires a

purchase in good faith for value and without notice. See Big Four
Petroleum Company v. Quirk. 755 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1988).

In 77 Am.

Jur. 2d, "Vendor and Purchaser," § 646, the authors define "good
faith" as consisting of an honest intention to abstain from taking
any unconscientious advantage of another. Regarding notice, 77 Am.
Jur. then indicates the following:
Notice of a prior interest which will be
effective to charge a subsequent purchaser with
knowledge of its existence may be either direct
information of the prior right, or may consist of
information or facts from which actual knowledge
may be inferred; the notice need not be actual, but
may be constructive or implied.
It need not
contain complete information of every fact material
for the purchaser to know. Where actual notice of
an outstanding interest is duly given, the
purchaser is chargeable with notice of all that an
inquiry of the person giving the notice of the
outstanding interest would have disclosed. Id.,
§ 647, emphasis added.
In the instant case, it is obvious that Appellants had
notice both from their surveyor, Mr. Whitehead, and from the
extensive limitations in their title policy, that there were
apparent encroachments by reason of homes occupied by other
parties, homes which allegedly overlapped land which Appellants
39

intended to purchase.

With the foregoing in mind, and without

notification to their sellers or prior discussion with Respondents
herein, Appellants completed their purchase.
In Blodaett v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978), the
Utah Supreme Court held that a bona fide purchaser is one who takes
without actual or constructive knowledge of facts sufficient to put
him on notice of the complainant's equity.

Id. at 303, citing,

inter alia.

Sieger v. Standard Oil Company. 318 P.2d 479 (Cal.

App. 1957).

Lest there be any confusion in the instant case, the

testimony of Charles Englert, a man who had purchased over 100
parcels of real estate, and his wife, a retired broker and title
officer, clearly established that they were fully aware that their
title was clouded on the date of purchase. They contended at trial
that they had personally offered to sell the disputed land to
Respondents for twenty-five cents a square foot.

This testimony

shocked Respondents, who uniformly proffered, with no crossexamination, that no such offer had ever been made. Subsequent to
the trial court1s award to Appellants of twenty-five cents a square
foot as to the McNeils, Appellants seek reversal of the entire
decision,

again

seemingly

desiring

Respondents from accessing the river.

the

power

to

prohibit

Clearly, the equities in

this case mandate otherwise.
D.

ONE SEEKING EQUITY MUST HAVE CLEAN HANDS

In the instant case, Appellants do not come before the
court as bona fide purchasers with clean hands.

Historically,

mandatory injunctions requiring removal of an encroachment by an
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adjoining landowner have been refused where Plaintiff was not in
court with clean hands.

See Ann. 28 A.L.R. 2d, § 12 at p. 719.

Utah cases have also recognized the prerequisite of clean hands for
one seeking an equitable, rather than legal solution. See Park v.
Jamison. 364 P.2d 112, Utah 2d 141 (1961); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen,
557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976).

In the Oklahoma case of Big Four

Petroleum Co. v. Quirk. 755 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1988), the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, once again addressing the definition of good faith
purchasers, which is inextricably entwined, in terms of equity,
with the clean hands doctrine, cited Wilson v. Pennington. 474 P.2d
658 (Okla. 1970), for the following proposition:
A purchaser with notice is considered a purchaser
made male fide, and a purchaser with notice is not
entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser,
but takes subject to outstanding interests, even
though he may have given full value. In such case,
the purchaser stands in the same position as the
one from whom he purchased.
The

Englerts

do

not

have

clean hands; they

are male

fide

purchasers. The equitable solution, fashioned in large part by the
trial court judge, recognized appropriate equitable principles and
properly applied them to do equity to the only innocent parties in
the case, that is, Respondents.
E.

THE GENERAL RULE OF LAW FAVORS THE IMPOSITION OF
LEGAL DAMAGES OVER EQUITABLE REMEDIES
Where there is a legal remedy available to the parties,

to which resort may be had without any substantial or irreparable
damage, the parties may not ordinarily seek equitable relief. See
Erisman v. Overman. 11 Utah 2d 258, 358 P.2d 85 (1961).
equity

will

not

intervene

and
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require

the

removal

Thus,
of

an

encroachment when there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at
law. See S.P.C.S.. Inc. v. Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construction
Co., 631 P.2d 999 (Wash. App. 1981).

So strong is this doctrine

that sister states have held that one seeking the interposition of
equity must, as a prerequisite, show that he has no remedy at law,
or that no legal remedy is otherwise adequate.

See Knaebel v.

Heiner, 663 P.2d 551 (Alaska 1983); see also 30 C.J.S. "Equity",
§ 20, et. sec.
In the instant case, the availability of an adequate and
determinable legal remedy was clearly evident to the trier of fact.
Evidence as to values of the alleged encroachment was put before
the court by both parties.

Appellants called themselves as

witnesses, and Respondents countered with Mr. Russ Walter, as well
as cross-examination of Appellants. Furthermore, the amount of the
so-called encroachment, in terms of the exact square feet, was
proffered by Appellants, through their engineer, Mr. Whitehead;
this proffer as to the square feet of the encroachment was accepted
by Respondents and duly noted in the record and memorandum decision
by the Court. Neither party presented any evidence of setbacks or
of any square footage, either lesser or greater in nature than that
extrapolated by Appellants' engineer and submitted by Appellants at
trial for Respondents1 approval, which approval was received. The
evidence was clearly before the court to fashion a legal remedy,
and the court, in its discretion, did so.

That discretion should

not be disturbed on appeal, absent clear abuse.
not met their burden.
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Appellants have

VI.

POINT III OP APPELLANTS1 BRIEF/ WHICH INDICATES THAT THE
TRIAL COURT ACTED ARBITRARILY IN STRUCTURING ITS
EQUITABLE REMEDY FOR THE McNEILS TO ACCOMMODATE
THEIR ALLEGED ENCROACHMENT, SHOULD BE SUMMARILY
REJECTED
In Point III of Appellant's brief, Appellant's counsel

states that the trial court "acted completely arbitrarily and with
no factual support upon which to base its acts."

(AB at 14)

In

point of fact, Appellants now argue that in fashioning a legal
remedy, the trial court should somehow have whittled down a smaller
section of land than that awarded to the McNeils, which was to the
edge of the Santa Clara River. Appellants now state that the trial
court should have considered such things as the "location of septic
tanks, plumbing, electrical connections, zoning requirements for
side yards and setbacks, and the livable spaces necessary to make
such a home saleable in the market . . . "

Id.

It was Appellants,

however, who, through their surveyor provided the court with the
alleged square footage of the encroachments, and it was Appellants
who failed to indicate to the Court any possible way in which these
encroachments might otherwise be limited.
The square footage of the alleged encroachments was
proffered into evidence by the Appellants through their engineer
and surveyor. This proffer was accepted. Appellants now complain,
however, that
[n]othing was said about applicable zoning
regulation, setback and side yard requirements,
land necessary to provide services such as sewer,
water, telephone and electrical power or any other
items of like nature. (AB at 14)
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The fact is, however, that the trial court specifically found that
there remained, on the southeast side of the river to Lots 12 and
13, sufficient area for the Plaintiffs to construct a residence as
they testified they desired to do,

(R at 197-98)

Furthermore,

once again, if Appellants wanted to limit the encroachments to
areas lesser than that proffered by their expert, then the burden
of proof was certainly on Appellants to provide the trial court
with evidence to structure a legal remedy which was lesser in
nature.

To complain on appeal about hypothetical evidence of

zoning and side yard requirements which Appellants

failed to

proffer is absurd.
The trial court clearly has the discretion to take the
evidence which it received, compare the equities, and allow the
encroachment to remain, even were the encroachment to have affected
the entire parcel purchased by Respondents. That the whole parcel
may

sometimes

be

affected

by

the

disturbance,

and

indeed,

compensated by legal and not equitable damages, is discussed in
part by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Marv Jane Stevens Co.
v. First National Building Company,

supra. at 39; see also Zerr v.

Heceta Lodge No. 111. Independent Order of Odd Fellows. 523 P.2d
1018 (Oregon 1974).
The colloquy between Appellants1 counsel and the trial
court judge during the course of proceedings below is telling.
Recited at length, supra at Section 6, it details an exchange which
summarizes the visible and factual evidence which was before the
trial court.

As Appellants failed to provide the court with any
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remedy other than the stipulated square footages requisite to
calculating damage or the sheer removal of the encroachment, the
trial court accepted the legal remedy.

Appellants1 counsel at

trial specifically recognized the trial court's discretion in doing
so. It cannot be gainsaid that Appellants were responsible for the
square footage calculations to the river's edge through their own
expert.

Furthermore,

Appellants'

counsel

conceded

the

appropriateness of the trial court leaving the "encroachments"
intact and pursuing a legal remedy.

On appeal, Appellants now

complain about the extent of the remedy fashioned. See 28 Am. Jur.
2d "Estoppel and Waiver", § 114, 131; see also J.P. Koch, Inc. v.
J.C. Penny, Inc., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah 1975).
Simply stated, Point III of Appellants' brief recites a
scenario of what might have been. The burden of proof to otherwise
limit the extent of the encroachment by argument and reference to
side

yard

requirements

and

other

factors

was

Appellants.

Appellants failed to provide the court with any other alternative
than allowing the encroachment and calculating a valuation based
upon

the

square

feet

proffered

surveyor, Mr. Whitehead.

by

Appellants'

engineer

and

The trial court did exactly this, and in

its colloquy with Appellants' counsel foreshadowed the thrust of
its opinion.
introduce

Even with this knowledge, Appellants chose not to

additional

evidence

alternative to the court.

which

might

suggest

a

lesser

Now, on appeal, they raise their voice

and seek to criticize for the first time this portion of the trial
court's decision.

Once again, this criticism should fall on deaf
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ears, as it was Appellants, not Respondents, who bore the burden of
showing that a lesser encroachment would, nonetheless, do equity to
both parties.

Appellants failed to meet this burden, and should

not be heard to complain of it on appeal.
VII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING APPELLANTS1 RESURVEY
AS DISTURBING THE SANTA CLARA RIVER AS THE NORTH/SOUTH
BOUNDARY BETWEEN LOTS 6 AND 7 AND LOTS 12 AND 13
Russell

Walter

testified

that when

he

created

the

Brookside Summer Homes Subdivision, his specific intent was to use
the meandering Santa Clara River as the dividing line between lots
on the east and west of that non-navigable stream.

Mr. Walter

testified that the lots in the subdivision were staked, and that
when the lots were sold he personally took the purchasers to the
staked lines, which were placed approximately fifteen feet from the
river, so that each and every buyer would know that his boundary
ceased at the edge of the river.

In the chain of title to all but

two of the parcels conveyed, Mr. Walter inserted the reservation
"less and excepting that portion crossing the Santa Clara River."
Furthermore, pursuant to Rule 803(20) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, the trial court heard substantial reputation testimony
concerning the boundaries. A substantial amount of homeowners on
both sides of the subdivision have constructed their homes, and for
periods between fifteen and twenty-three years occupied to the edge
of the river.

In light of that, Justice Stewart's opinion in the

case of Bountiful v. Reillv, 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989) is telling:
Generally, a resurvey cannot disturb boundaries
established by original survey monuments, even if
the original survey was incorrect. Henrie v. Hyer.
92 Utah 530, 537, 70 P.2d 154, 157 (1937);
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Washington Rock Company v. Young. 29 Utah 108, 11819, 80 P. 382, 386 (1905). This doctrine preserves
the property rights of individuals who may have
reasonably relied upon the original survey.
There is no testimony before the court which indicates
that either the Zanes or the McNeils or their predecessors in
interest

acted

unreasonably

in constructing

their homes and

occupying the same to the edge of the river which they understood
to be their boundary line.

It was testified at trial that the

original survey was incorrect, and that if the stakes were placed
as Mr. Walter testified, it was done so in a mistaken fashion.
That portion of the trial court's opinion, which in effect restaked
Lots 12 and 13 as testified to by surveyor Whitehead is in error
and should be reversed. Where the original monument as a boundary
between the lots on the east and west of the centerline of the
subdivision was known and recognized as the Santa Clara River, that
monument should not be altered at trial some twenty-three years
after the creation of the subdivision.
VIII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INTERPRET AND/OR
REFORM THE NATURE OF THE LANGUAGE APPEARING IN
THE RESERVATIONS
In the chain of title of all but two of the deeds to the

lots in the Brookside Summer Homes Subdivision, the lot description
contains the reservation "less and excepting that portion crossing
the Santa Clara River." Mr. Walter testified, as did others, that
it was obvious that the homeowners interpreted this provision over
a period of almost two decades as requiring that their lots
terminate at the edge of the river.

The trial court, impressed

with the fact that Mr. Newville had failed to follow Mr. Walterfs
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instruction in preparing PI, the original subdivision Plat, held
that

that

mistake

rendered

the

reservation

a

nullity.

In

paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Findings of Fact, the trial court states
its presumption and factual findings as follows:
4.
As Mr. Walter sold the lots in his
subdivision to various buyers he informed each
buyer whose lots appeared to abut the river that
they were in fact acquiring title to the center
line of the river and nothing on the other side of
the river.
This was based upon Mr. Walter's
assumption that his instructions to Mr. Newville
had been followed. Mr. Walter also inserted in all
but two deeds issued in the B.S.H.S. Subdivision a
reservation which he intended to act as a guarantee
that even if the course of the river changed the
boundary line between the lots would change with
it. The language of the reservation conveyed the
property "less any part crossing the Santa Clara
River". This language was contained in the deed
issued to the first purchaser of Lot 13 and to
several others thereafter but was not included in
the chain of deeds to the purchasers of Lot 12.
5. The Court finds that the reservation in
the deeds was based on the presumption set forth in
paragraph four above, which presumption was a
mistake; as such, the reservation is ineffective
and a nullity.
It is suggested herein that the trial court in this case
was empowered to either construe or reform the chains of title to
conform to the subdivider's original intent and the reputation in
the locality, where to do otherwise would result in an injustice.
The power of reformation and/or interpretation is clearly within
the province of the judge's equitable authority.

See Mabev v. Kay

Petersen Construction Co.. 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984).
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IX.

THE SUPREME COURT IN THE INSTANT CASE MAY DEEM IT
APPROPRIATE TO AWARD RESPONDENTS ATTORNEY'S
FEES FOR DEFENDING THIS APPEAL
Under Title 78 of the Utah Code, Respondents are entitled

to attorney's fees in the event an appeal, based on the law and
facts of the case, appears frivolous in nature.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment accomplishes an appropriate
balancing of equities in the instant case. Respondents, however,
urge this Court to equitably apply both boundary by acquiescence
and

prescriptive

particularly,
Respondents

in
also

easement
light
contend

doctrines

of

to

Appellants'
that

the

Respondents
bad

trial

faith
court

McNeil,
purchase.

failed

to

appropriately assess the impact of the assessment and taxation
system in Washington County regarding adverse possession.
In 1988, the Santa Clara River had served as a known and
conceded boundary for twenty-three years. A resurvey, concededly
in error, should not artificially alter that boundary.

Lastly,

Appellants should not be heard to complain about the trial court's
determination of damages where the descriptions of the encroachment
were proffered by them.

Appellants position on appeal seems

frivolous, and begs consideration of an award of attorney's fees.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

ay of March, 1992.

MICHAEL D. HUGHES, FOR
THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a four full, true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing APPELLANTS1 BRIEF were placed in the
United States mail at St. George, Utah, with first-class postage
thereon fully prepaid on the

lay of March, 1992, addressed

as follows:
Mr. Phillip L. Foremaster
247 Sugar Leo Road
St. George, Utah 84770-7944
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES C. ENGLERT and JO ANN
ENGLERT, husband and wife,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiffs,
vs.
HENRY E. ZANE and DOROTHY G. ZANE,
husband and wife; and JOHN A. McNEIL
and KATHIE McNEIL, husband and wife,
Civil No, 890502581
Defendants.

This matter came on for trial to the bench on October
24th & 26th, 1990, the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding.

The

Plaintiffs, Charles C. and JoAnn Englert were present and
represented by their attorney, Phillip L. Foremaster.

The

Defendants, Henry E. and Dorothy Zane and John A. and Kathie
McNeil were present and represented by their attorney, Michael D.
Hughes.

The Defendants had filed a Third Party Complaint naming

Russell and Patricia Walter and the Lucky 7 Rodeo Corporation, a
Utah corporation, as Third-party Defendants.

Mr. Walter was

present and all Third-Party Defendants were represented by Gary W.
Pendleton, their attorney.

During the trial the Defendants/Third

Party Plaintiffs and the Third-Party Defendants reached a
stipulated settlement of their dispute and upon stipulation of all

1.
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parties the Court dismissed the Third-Party Complaint.
Thereafter, Mr. Pendleton left and neither he nor those
represented by him participated further as parties.
The Court took evidence in the matter, viewed the
property in question at the request of the parties, and heard
arguments of counsel.
submission.

The matter was then taken under

The Court now renders the following Decision and

Judgment upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
FINDINGS OF FACT
In the mid-1960's, Russell and Patricia Walter owned a
tract of land north of the town of Veyo in Washington County,
Utah.

They decided to subdivide the land and in doing so

eventually created the Brookside Summer Homes Subdivision
(E.S.H.S.).

The property was surveyed by one Jack R. Newville, a

registered land surveyor and professional engineer.

The B.S.H.S.

plat was approved and recorded in the office of the Washington
County Recorder in mid-1965.

Thereafter, the lots were sold to

various buyers, primarily by Russell Walter.
The Washington County Assessor assessed

taxes on the

subdivided lots on the basis on the recorded subdivision plat.
Prior to survey, Mr. Walter instructed Mr. Newville tha
he should lay out the subdivision , insofar as possible, to make

2.
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the Santa Clara River, which traverses the property, the common
boundary between the lots on each side.

It was Mr. Walter's

intention and design that the lots on both sides of the river have
title to the center line of the river.

After the subdivision map

was completed, it appeared that Mr. Walter's instructions had been
followed as there was a meandering border down the center of the
subdivision which Mr. Walters, and everyone else, assumed followed
the course of the river.

The location of the river did not appear

on the subdivision plat.

There was no attempt to check on the

assumption regarding the river border until 1988 when the
Plaintiffs in this case commissioned a survey of Lots 12 and 13 in
preparation for purchase thereof.

The survey revealed that the

river was not on the boundary line between those lots and Lots 5,
6 and 7 which adjoined Lots 12 and 13 on the northwest.
As Mr. Walter sold the lots in his subdivision to
various buyers he informed each buyer whose lot appeared to abut
the river that they were in fact acquiring title to the center
line of the river and nothing on the other side of the river.
This was based on Mr. Walter's assumption that his instructions to
Mr. Newville had been followed.

Mr. Walter also inserted in all

but two deeds issued in the B.S.H.S. subdivision a reservation
which he intended to act as a guarantee that even if the course of

3.

the river changed the boundary line between the lots v/ould change
with it.

The language of the reservation conveyed the property

"less any part crossing the Santa Clara Piver".

This language was

contained in the deed issued to the first purchaser of Lot 13 and
to several others thereafter but was not included in the chain of
deeds to the purchasers of Lot 12.
In the first year or so after the subdivision was
recorded/ Mr. Walter sold Lot 7 to Mr. and Mrs. Karr on a Real
Estate Sales Contract.

The Karrs immediately took possession and

began building a house on the lot which v/as completed by the end
of 1967 or the beginning of 1968.

In 1969, after the real estate

contract was paid off, Mr. Walter recorded a warranty deed
transferring title from the Lucky 7 Rodeo Corporation to the
Karrs.

The Karrs were told at the time that they purchased the

property that they owned the land up to the center of the river
and were actually taken to the property and shown survey stakes by
Mr. Walter which he said evidenced that boundary.

The Karrs

purchased the property after receiving those representations.
Immediately after signing the real estate contract the Karrs began
using the land to the river's edge for various recreational
pursuits, as a back yard, for access to the river and for the
maintenance of landscaping such as grasses and trees.

Some of the

plants in the area were natural and some imported and planted by
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the Karrs.

The area was kept groomed to the water's edge. Mr.

Walter observed this use and testified that it continued for
several years after the Karrs took possession.
Within a short time after the Karrs bought Lot 7, Mr.
and Mrs. Glenn Myers bought Lot 6, also on a land sales
agreement.

They also took possession of the property immediately

and placed a mobile home thereon.

The exact date that they

purchased the property or took possession was not established by
the evidence but the Karrs and the Myers were among the first
purchasers in the subdivision.

Title to Lot 7 was transferred by

warranty deed to the Myers in 1972 after they paid off their land
sales contract.

The county tax records indicate a mobile home

first appeared on the property in the 1970 assessment.

The Myers

were also told by Mr. Walter when they purchased that their land
extended to the center line of the river.

Sometime after their

purchase of the land, the Myers began using the property to the
water's edge much in the same way as the Karrs were doing.
The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
Lots 6 and 7 were used much in the same fashion through various
owners thereafter to the present title holders, Mr. and
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Mrs. Zane on Lot 7 and Mr. and Mrs. McNeil on Lot 6, the testimony
of Mr. Santa Maria notwithstanding.

The Court's onsight

inspection revealed that both the Zanes and the McNeils continue
to use the land in the same ways as did their predecessors.
The Washington County Assessor assumed that the river
was the boundary between Lots 5, 6 and 7 on one side and Lots 12
and 13 on the other but the taxes were assessed not on the
location of the river but on the location of the property lines as
shown on the subdivision plat recorded in the County Recorder's
Office.

The Court finds that no taxes for Lots 12 and 13 were

ever paid by the owners of Lots 6 and 7.
When these Plaintiffs commissioned the 1988 re-survey of
Lots 12 and 13, which lots they intended to acquire from one
Dorothy Wirtz, they discovered that the survey did not follow the
river as the boundary between Lots 12 and 13 on one the hand, and
Lots 5, 6 and 7 on the other.

Indeed the re-survey showed that

the Santa Clara River runs through Lots 12 and 13 and Lots 6 and 7
do not abut the river at all.

In addition, the re-survey showed

that the homes on Lots 6 and 7 were actually situated astride the
property boundaries.

The home built by Karrs on Lot 7 and now

occupied by the Zanes is actually partially on Lot 7 and partially
on Lot 12. The home (mobile home with a permanent and fixed

6.

addition) placed by Myers and now occupied by McNeils, is partly
on Lot 6, partly on Lot 12, and party on Lot 13.
Cn May 2, 1989, the Englerts filed this suit alleging
encroachment and praying for removal of the encroaching
structures.

The defense answered and counterclaimed asserting

several affirmative defenses.
The Plaintiffs testified that in their opinion the
property north and west of the Santa Clara River had a value of
fifty cents per square foot.

They also testified that if the

Defendants were allowed to take a portion of the property north
and west of the Santa Clara River from Lots 12 and 13, any portion
remaining on that side of the river would be reduced in value by
one-half.

On the other hand, Mr. Walter testified on the basis of

his expertise regarding values in the subdivision and real
property generally in that area of Washington County that land
values have decreased about 20 per cent since the Plaintiffs
bought Lots 12 and 13 from Mrs. Wirtz at a total price of
$22,900.00 for both lots.

That purchase price equates to 25 cents

per square foot.
ANALYSIS
The Plaintiffs Complaint alleges encroachment by the
Defendants.

The law is settled that no person has the right to

erect buildings or other structures upon his own land so that any
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part thereof will extend beyond his boundaries onto the land of an
adjoining property owner. (1 Am Jur 2d, Section 118, page 769).
The predecessors in interest of the defendants in this matter have
clearly violated this rule of law.

That does not however end our

inquiry in the matter.
The Plaintiffs herein seek the equitable remedy of
ejectment of the Defendants.

They wish to have the Court order

the Defendants to remove the encroaching structures from Lots 12
and 13.

The Court is therefore constrained to consider the

peculiar equities of this case to determine whether the Plaintiffs
are entitled to this equitable relief.
This case presents some unusual circumstances. It
appears that the subdivider of the property and all those who
bought in the subdivision up to the Plaintiffs simply assumed that
the river constituted the boundary line between the various pieces
of property.

The subdivider so informed all of those to whom he

sold pieces of property.

In addition, the subdivider included

language in the deeds to Lots 5, 6, 7 and 13 which he intended to
assure that the property line would remain the center line of the
river.
It also appears that if the encroaching structures are
moved they would be destroyed, or severely damaged and that those
structures are valued at $80,000.00 to $85,000.00 each. These
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structures appear to have been in place for less than 20 years in
the case of the McNeils and over 20 years in the case of the Zanes
prior to the filing of this lawsuit.

In addition, the survey plat

which established the actual property boundaries has been a matter
of public record in the VZashington County Recorder's office for
over 24 years prior to the filing of the lawsuit.
There is no evidence before this Court that prior to
these Plaintiffs, anyone ever complained about the location of the
boundaries or questioned the location of the Defendants' homes.
All previous owners in the subdivision have assumed that the
boundary was the center line of the river, although a- routine
survey would have shown the discrepency.
As the subdivision was actually laid out the river would
run through Lots 12 and 13 and divide those lots.

That would

leave small parcels of Lots 12 and 13 to the north and west of the
river which would not be suitable for construction of residences
and which would not be accessable from the main portion of those
lots without construction of a bridge at considerable expense in
view of the fact that the river often rises dramatically during
the runoff season.
The Plaintiffs have not undertaken construction of
improvements on Lots 12 and 13 and there remains on the southeast
side of the river sufficient area for the Plaintiffs to construct
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a residence as they testified they desired to do.

Both the

Plaintiffs' and the Defendants' predecessors in interest purchased
their lots with the clear understanding that the center line of
the river was the boundary.

The subdivider and the County Tax

Assessor also have believed that such was the case and and have so
represented the situation to the property owners.

The Plaintiffs

were aware of the boundary dispute when they purchased Lots 12 and
13.
In weighing these equities the Court is convinced that
requiring removal of the encroaching structures would not do
equity.

The persons now possessing the residences did not

construct them, and did not know that they were encroaching on
adjoining properties at the time that they purchased the
property.

In addition, there is no evidence that the predecessors

in interest of these Plaintiffs ever raised an objection to the
construction of the encroaching structures and in fact it appears
that those predecessors bought their land with the understanding
that their land only extended to the center line of the river.
The Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiffs have an
adequate remedy at law since their loss can be compensated by
assessment of damages in their favor if in fact they are entitled
to any legal remedy at all. Assessing damages and allowing the
encroachments to remain will not destroy or significantly hinder
the intended use and enjoyment of the property contemplated by the
Plaintiffs.
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The Court then turns to the question of whether or not
the Plaintiffs are entitled to any remedy in face of the defenses
raised by the Defendants.

The Defendants have listed several

defenses in their Answer but have not briefed or asserted all of
them.

The defenses which the Defendants have asserted are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Adverse possession;
Statute of limitations;
Boundary by acquiescence;
Boundary by agreement;
Prescriptive easement (profit a prendre).

The Court will address those defenses seriatum.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
The Defendants attempted to show through testimony of
the Washington County Assessor and his subordinates that they had
paid taxes for more than seven years on those portions of Lots 12
and 13 north and west of the river.
their contention.

The evidence did not support

It is clear that the tax assessment was based

on the lots as shown on the public record.

The assessor did not

check the survey and was not aware that parts of Lots 12 and 13
were located north and west of the river.

The assessor made no

adjustment to the taxes for any of the lots on the basis that the
McNeils and the Zanes and their predecessors were occupying land
in Lots 12 and 13.

In short, there was no evidence presented

which would allow this Court to find that the owners of Lots 6 and
7 ever paid taxes on any portion of Lots 12 and 13.

11.

Adverse possession has been codified in Utah,

Section

78-12-12 U.C.A., 1953 as Amended, clearly provides that title by
adverse possession cannot be acquired without payment of ". . .
all taxes which have been levied and assessed upon such land
according to law".

The defense of adverse possession must fail

since there is no showing that the owners of Lots 5 and 7 ever
paid any taxes on any portions of Lots 12 and 13.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The Defendants did not press this defense except to
briefly mention it as it relates to their claim of adverse
possession.

Since the adverse possession defense has failed it

follows that this defense must also fail.

In addition, Section

78-12-6 U.C.A. is inapplicable since the Defendants were "seized"
(legal title holders) of the disputed property within 7 years of
filing the suit.
BOUNDAPY BY ACQUIESCENCE
The Utah Supreme Court has recently addressed Boundary
by Acquiescence on several occasions.

The most recent cases

re-establish four elements to be proven by the proponent:
1.
2.
3.

Occupation up to a visibile line marked by
monuments, fences or buildings;
Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary;
For a long period of time;

4.

By adjoining land owners.

(See Judd Family Limited Partnership v. Hutchings,
141 U.A.P. 8;

Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P. 2d 417).
12.
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A review of the cases decided in Utah does not reveal
whether a river constitutes a sufficient monument of a boundary to
establish the above elements.

Other authorities have held,

however, that a river may be a sufficient monument to mark a

"When relating to land, a monument is some
tangible landmark established to indicate a
boundary. Objects, to be ranked as monuments,
have been required to have certain physical
properties such as visibility, permanence
and stability, and definite location,
independent of measurements. Monuments are
of two kinds, natural and artificial. . ."
(See 11 C.J.S. Boundaries,Section 5, page 545).
"Natural monuments are objects permanent in
character which are found on the land as they
were placed by nature, such as . . . streams
and rivers."
(See 11 C.J.S. Boundaries, Section 6, page 546
and footnote 88, same page.)
[See also Ellery v. Pacific Lumber Co., 281
P. 428 (Cal.); Drake v. Russian River Land Co.;
103 P. 167 (Cal.); Goodson v. Fitzgerald,
90 S.W. 898 (Texas) ]
Under the facts of this case this Court finds that the
Santa Clara River is a sufficient boundary monument.

It is clear

from the testimony of the subdivider that each lot owner who
purchased in the subdivision was told that the river was in fact
the boundary.

There is no evidence that the river has moved.

The

13.

2c:i

river is certainly visible, permanent and stable, and has a
definite location.
The evidence clearly shows that the Defendants and their
predecessors in interest have occupied those portions of Lots 12
and 13 north and west of the river and abutting Lots 6 and 7 as
though the river were the boundary.
The next element is mutual acquiescence in the river as
a boundary.
The Court finds that no one ever questioned the river
being the boundary until 1988.

It appears that everyone living in

the subdivision assumed that the river was the boundary and
conducted themselves accordingly.

The prior owners of Lots 12 and

13 never disputed the Defendants1 occupation of the now disputed
portions of Lots 12 and 13 prior to these Plaintiffs, for a period
of some 23 years after the subdivision was created.

The doctrine

of boundary by acquiescence does not require an agreement between
adjoining landowners to establish a particular monument as a
boundary.

Rather it requires only that the adjoining owners treat

the monument as a boundary for the required time period.

This is

more akin to a prescriptive right than a contractual right. [See
Law of Practical Location of Boundaries and the Need for an
Adverse Possession Remedy, Brigham Young University Law Review,

14.

1986, by James H. Backman, hereinafter B.Y.U. L.R. 1986.1

This

doctrine is founded on the policy ennunciated by the Supreme Court
when it said,
" . . . that the peace and good order of
society require that there be stability
. . . in the ownership and occupation of
lands . . . [B]oundary lines which have
been long established and accepted by
those who should be concerned should be
left undisturbed in order to leave at rest
matters which may have resulted in
controversy and litigation . . ."
[Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment Co.,
511 P. 2d 145, 147 (1973) ]
It is not necessary that the boundary was established by
the parties, or their predecessors in interest as a result of a
dispute or uncertainty.

[Staker v. Ainsworth, supra.]

It appears therefore that the owners of Lots 12 and 13
on one side and Lots 6 and 7 on the other did acquiesce in the
river being the boundary line.
With regard to the third element, "for a long period of
time", the Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Hobson v.
Panguitch Lake Corporation, 530 P. 2d, 792, page 795, as follows:
"But the opinion reaffirms the view that there
must be some substantial long period of time
and states that it is generally related to the
common-law prescriptive easement period of
20 years; and only under unusual circumstances
would a lesser period be deemed sufficient."
15,
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It is clear that acquiescence in the boundary by
adjoining property owners must span at least 20 years absent
unusual circumstances.

In the case of the Zanes, whose original

predecessors in interest were the Karrs, it is clear that the time
requirements for boundary by acquiescence have been met.

In the

case of the McNeils, who traced their interests to the original
purchasers, the Myers, there is some question as to the length of
time that the acquiescence has been ongoing.

The evidence is

clear with regard to Lot 7 that it has been occupied by the Zanes
or their predecessors in interest at least since early 1968, as
has that portion of Lot 12 north and west of the Santa Clara River.
However, the evidence does not establish when Lot 6 and
the portions of Lots 12 and 13, which are north and west of the
river and abut Lot 6, were occupied by the McNeils1 predecessors
in interest.

The McNeils have failed to carry their burden of

proof on that point.

This Court must find, therefore, that

although the McNeils are now occupying up the the river's edge and
have been doing so for a considerable period, there is
insufficient evidence to establish that they have been doing so
for at least 20 years.
Therefore, the third element of boundary by acquiescence
has been shown as to defendants Zane but not as to defendants
McNeil.

16.
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The fourth element, "by adjoining landowners" is obvious
and has been established.
The Court therefore finds that defendants Zane are
entitled to a judgment quieting title in them to that parcel
identified as parcel A on Plaintiff's Exhibit #3 under the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.

Defendants McNeil are not

so entitled.
BOUNDARY BY AGREEMENT
Boundary by Agreement requires:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

An agreement,
between adjoining landowners.
Settling a boundary that was uncertain or
in dispute,
executed by actual location of a boundary
line,
mutual acquiescence for a long period of
time.

(See Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P. 2d 417, footnote 4,
page 423; B.Y.U. L.R. 1936, page 963.)
Boundary by Agreement is premised on a contract theory.
The rationale is that the parties, discovering that they had an
uncertain or disputed boundary, would get together and settle the
matter by agreement, locate an actual boundary line between them,
and mutually honor that boundary for a long period of time (20
years or more). The facts in this case do not support boundary by
agreement.

Until the 1988 survey commissioned by the Plaintiffs

17.

herein none of the lot owners was aware that there was an
uncertainty or dispute as to the boundary line.

Thereafter there

was never any agreement establishing a boundary line.

Boundary by

agreement does not apply under these facts.
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT (Profit a Prendre)
In the Utah Supreme Court case of Anderson v.
Osguthorpe, 504 P. 2d 1000 (1972), Justice Ellott discussed the
establishment of a prescriptive easement in the nature of profit a
prendre.

It appears that the elements which must be shown by the

proponent of such an easement are as follows:
1.
2.
3.

Exclusive use of the disputed land
for over 20 years
with use thereof being open and notorious,
continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, and
under claim of right.

This Court finds from the evidence that the Zanes have
met the requirements to establish a prescriptive easement over the
disputed portions of Lot 12. The evidence clearly demonstrates
that the Defendants Zane and their predecessors in interest
exercised exclusive use of the property upon which their home is
situated and behind that home up to the edge of the river from the
time that they purchased the property and took possession of it, a
period of over 20 years.

It is likewise clear from the facts that

18.

206

the use of the property by the Defendants Zane herein was open and
notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse and under claim of
right, versus the owners of Lot 12 and was under a claim of right
based on the representations made to the original buyers by the
subdivider.
However, for the reasons set out hereinabove in
analyzing boundary by acquiescence, this Court finds that the
Defendants McNeil have failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that their use of the disputed portions of Lots 12 and 13
abutting Lot 6 has continued for the required 20 years.

Therefore

that use has not ripened into a prescriptive easement.
This Court therefore finds that if the Defendants Zane
had not acquired title to the property under the doctrine of
boundary of acquiescence they would have acquired a prescriptive
easement to use the property as it is now being used and has been
used historically.

In view of such a right to use the property

the Plaintiffs herein are entitled to no award of damages against
Defendants Zane.
The Defendants McNeil are not entitled to a prescriptive
easement.
ESTOPPEL
Defendants raised estoppel as an affirmative defense in
their Answer but did not assert that defense during trial. For
purposes of resolving all possible legal issues, however, the
Court will discuss estoppel as it applies to this case.

19.

The elements of boundary by estoppel are:
1.

Representations by the true owner that
the mutually accepted line is the
true boundary;
2. reasonable reliance by the neighbor on
those representations;
3. substantial costs detrimentally incurred
by the neighbor, and
4. true owner knows that his representations
are erroneous or was grossly negligent
in making the representations.
(See 8.Y.U. E.R. 1986, page 968)
In the case before this Court it appears that all the
elements are met except the last.

There is no evidence that the

original owner, Mr. Walter, knew that the river was not the
boundary.

Likewise, there is no evidence he was grossly negligent

in making that representation to his buyers in view of his
instructions to the surveyor and the appearance of the B.S.K.S.
plat map with the boundary line seeming to track the river.
Boundary by estoppel in not made out.
DAMAGES
The Court now turns to the issue of damages to be
assessed against Defendants McNeil for their wrongful encroachment
on Lots 12 and 13 and their wrongful possession and use of parcels
B & C as shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.
Upon stipulation, the parties agreed that parcel B
contains 5,401.84 square feet and parcel C contains 7,396.42
square feet.

The total of those parcels is therefore 12,798.26

square feet, which the Court will round down to 12,798.00.

20.

Plaintiffs purchased Lots 12 and 13 together at a total cost of
£22,900.00, or about 25 cents per square foot.

Plaintiffs contend

that the property has doubled in value and cite as proof certain
"comparable sales" in the area.

The Court can accord no weight to

those "comparable sales" since Plaintiffs candidly admitted they
had never seen those properties and had no idea how they actually
compared to the property in dispute, including whether they had
been improved.
On the other hand Defendants offered the testimony of
Mr. Walter who opined that the value of B.S.H.S. property has
declined 20 percent since the Plaintiffs purchase in 1988. No
supporting evidence was offered for Mr. Walter's opinion.
The Court finds that the best indicator of the value of
the property is the amount Plaintiff's paid when they purchased in
1988, or 25 cents per square foot.
SUMMARY
Plaintiffs are therefore awarded judgment against
Defendants McNeil in the amount of $3,199.50 plus interest at 10%
from May 2, 1989 to date of trial, October 26, 1990, plus costs
and interest on the entire judgment at 12% per annum simple
interest from October 26, 1990, until paid in full.

Title to the

portions of Lots 12 and 13 designated as parcels B and C is then
awarded to Defendants McNeil.

21.

Defendants Zane are awarded title to that portion of Lot
12 designated as parcel A*

No damages are assessed.

Mo attorney fees are awarded to either side.

Counsel

for Plaintiffs is to prepare an appropriate Judgment.
DATED this

/ ~"

day of November, 1990.

.fth District Judge

22.
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C E R T I F I C A T E

I hereby certify that on this
fJ^MMflJ
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day of

, a true and correct copy of the

above and foregoing was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, or
hand-delivered, to:

Phillip L. Forecaster, Esq.
P. 0. Box 572
St. George, UT 84771

Michael D. Hughes, Esq.
148 East Tabernalce
St. George, UT 84770

Gary W. Pendleton, Esq.
150 North 200 East, Suite #202
St. George, UT 84770
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APPENDIX II

iCT COURT
:: COUNTY

Phillip L. ForemaSter No. 1103
Attorney at Law

SI SEP 23 API 11 29

fx^xgg^g 247 Sugar Leo Road

CLEKl^ J-,,

St. George, Utah &*?Xfea&32 84770-7944
(801)673-2209
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAt DISTRICT,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES C. ENGLERT and JO ANN
ENGLERT, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

-vsHENRY E
G. ZANE
JOHN A
McNEIL,

. ZANE and DOROTHY
, husband and wife;
McNEIL and KATHIE
husband and wife,

Civil No. 890502581

and

Defendants.

This matter coming on for trial on October 24 and October 26,
1990 before the Court sitting without a jury and the Plaintiffs being
present and being represented by their attorney Phillip L. Foremaster
and the Defendants being present and being represented by their attorney
Michael D. Hughes and the Third-Party Defendant being present and
being represented by his attorney Gary W. Pendleton and during the
course of the trial a stipulation and agreement having been made
between the Third-Party Plaintiffs and the Third-Party Defendant
and he having been thereupon dismissed from the lawsuit and the
remaining parties having presented testimony and evidence in support
of their respective positions and the Court being fully advised in
the premises now finds as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
A.
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a tract of land north of the town of Veyo in Washington County, Utah
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and created thereon a subdivision known under the name and style
of Brookside Summer Homes Subdivision (B.S.H.S.).

The subject

property was surveyed by one Jack R. Newville, a registered land
surveyor and professional engineer and the B.S.H.S. subdivision plat
was approved and recorded in the Office of the Washington County,
Utah recorder in mid-1965.

Thereafter the subdivision lots were

solde to various buyers, primarily by Russell Walter.
2.

Since the recording of the B.S.H.S. Subdivision Plat the

Washington County, Utah Assessor has assessed taxes on the subdivided
lots on the basis of the information contained on the recorded
subdivision plat.
3.

Prior to the survey Mr. Walter instructed Mr. Newville that

he should lay out the subdivision, insofar as possible, to make the
Santa Clara River, which traverses the property, the common
boundary between the lots on each side.

It was Mr. Walter's intention

and design that the lots on both sides of the river have title to
the center line of the river.

After the subdivision map was completed,

it appeared that Mr. Walter's instructions had been followed as there
was a meandering border down the center of the subdivision which
Mr. Walter, and everyone else, assumed followed the course of the
river.

The location of the river did not appear on the subdivision

plat.

There was not attempt to check on the assumption regarding

the river border until 1988 when the Plaintiffs in this case commissioned a survey of Lots 12 and 13 in preparation for the purchase
thereof.

The survey revealed that the river was not on the boundary

line between those lots and Lots 5, 6 and 7 which adjoin Lots 12
and 13 on the Northwest.
4.

As Mr. Walter sold the lots in his subdivision to various

buyers he informed each buyer whose lots appeared to abut the river
that they were in fact acquiring title to the center line of the
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river and nothing on the other side of the river.

This was based

upon Mr. Walter's assumption that his instructions to Mr. Newville
had been followed.

Mr. Walter also inserted in all but two deeds

issued in the B.S.H.S. Subdivision a reservation which he intended
to act as a guarantee that even if the course of the river changed
the boundary line between the lots would change with it.
language of the reservation conveyed the property
crossing the Santa Clara River11.

The
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less any part

This language was contained in

the deed issued to the first purchaser of Lot 13 and to several others
thereafter but was not included in the chain of deeds to the purchasers of Lot 12.
5.

The Court finds that the reservation in the deeds was based

on the presumption set forth in paragraph four above, which presumption was a mistake; as such, the reservation is ineffective and a
nullity.
6.

In the first year or so after the subdivision was recorded,

Mr. Walter sold Lot 7 to Mr. and Mrs. Karr on a Real Estate Contract.
The Karrs immediately took possession and began building a house
on the lot which was completed by the end of 1967 or the beginning
of 1968.

In 1969, after the real estate contract was paid off, Mr.

Walter recorded a Warranty Deed transferring title from the Lucky
7 Rodeo Corporation to the Karrs.

The Karrs were told at the time

that they purchased the property that they owned the land up to the
center of the river and were actually taken to the property and shown
survey stakes by Mr. Walter which he said evidenced that boundary.
The Karrs purchased the property after receiving those representations,
Immediately after signing the real estate contract the Karrs began
using the land to the riverfs edge for various recreational pursuits,
as a back yard, for access to the river and for the maintenance of
landscaping such as grasses and trees.

Some of the plants in the

area were natural and some imported and planted by the Karrs. The
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area was kept groomed to the water's edge.

Mr. Walter observed this

use and testified that it continued for several years after the Karrs
took possession.
7.

Within a short time after the Karrs bought Lot 7, Mr. and

Mrs. Glenn Myers bought Lot 6, also on a land sales agreement.

They

also took possession of the property immediately and placed a mobile
home thereon.

The exact date that they purchased the property or

took possession was not established by the evidence but the Karrs
and the Myers were mong the first purchasers in the subdivision.
Title to Lot 6 was transferred by warranty deed to the Myers in 1972
after the ypaid off their land sales contract.

The county tax records

indicate a mobile home first appeared on the property in the 1970
assessment.

The Myers were also told by Mr. Walter when they purchased

that their land extended to the center line of the river.

Sometime

after their purchase of the land, the Myers began using the property
to the water's edge much in the same way as the Karrs were doing.
8.

The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that

Lots 6 and 7 were used much in the same fashion through various owners
thereafter to the present title holders, Mr. and Mrs. Zane on Lot
7 and Mr. and Mrs. McNeil on Lot 6, the testimony of Mr. Santa Maria
notwithstanding.

The Court's onsight inspection revealed that both

the Zanes and the McNeils continue to use the land in teh same ways
as did their predecessors.
9.

The Washington county Assessor assumed that the river was

the boundary between Lots 5,6 and 7 on the one side and Lots 12 and
13 on the other but the taxes were assessed not on the locaton of
the river but on the location of the property lines as shown on the
subdivison plat recorded in the County Recorder's Office.

The Court

finds that no taxes for Lots 12 and 13 were ever paid by the owners
of Lots 6 and 7.
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10.

When these Plaintiffs commissioned the 1988 re-survey of

Lots 12 and 13, which lots they intended to acquire from one Dorothy
Wirtz, they discovered that the survey did not follow the river as
boundary between Lots 12 and 13 on the one hand, and Lots 5,6 and
7 on the other.

Indeed the re-survey showed that the Santa Clara

River runs through Lots 12 and 13 and Lots 6 and 7 do not abut the
river at all.

In addition, the re-survey showed that the homes on

Lots 6 and 7 were actually situated astride the property boundaries.
The home built by the Karrs on Lot 7 and now occupied by the Zanes
is actually partially on Lot 7 and partially on Lot 12.

The home

(mobile home with a permanent and fixed addition) placed by Myers
and now occupied by McNeils, is partly on Lot 6, partly on Lot 12
and partly on Lot 13.
11.

On May 2, 1989 the Englerts filed this suit alleging

encroachment and praying for removal of the encroaching structures.
The defense answered and counterclaimed asserting several affirmative
defenses.
12.

The plaintiffs testified that in their opinion the property

north and west of the Santa Clara River had a value of fifty cents
per square foot.

They also testified that if the defendants were

allowed to take a portion of the property north and west of the Sana
Clara River from Lots 12 and 13, any portion remaining on that side
of the river would be reduced in value by one-half.

On the other

hand, Mr. Walter testified on the basis of his expertise regarding
values in the subdivison and real property generally in that area
of Washington County that land values have decreased about 20 per
cent since the Plaintiffs bought Lots 12 and 13 from Mrs. Wirtz at
a total price of $22,900.00 for both lots.

That purchase price

equates to 25 cents per square foot.
13.

The Plaintiff's complaint alleges encroachment by the
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Defendants.

The law is settled that no person has the right to

erect buildings or other structures upon his own land so that any
part thereof will extend beyond his boundaries onto the land of an
adjoining property owner.
14.

The Court finds that the predecessors in interst of the

Defendants in this matter have clearly violated this rule.
15.

The Plaintiffs herein seek the equitable remedy of ejectment

of the Defendant.

They wish to have the Court order the Defendants

to remove the encroaching structures from Lots 12 and 13.

The Court

is therefore constrained to consider the peculiar equities of this
case to determine whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to this equitable
relief.
16.

This case presents some unusual circumstances.

It appears

that the subdivider of the property and all those who. bought in the
subdivision up to the Plaintiffs simply assumed that the river
constituted the boundary line between the various pieces of property.
The subdivider so informed all of those to whom he sold pieces of
property.

In addition, the subdivider included language in the deeds

to Lots 5, 6,7 and 13 which he intended to assure that the property
line would remain the center line of the river.
17.

It also appears that if the encroaching structures are

moved they would be destroyed, or severely damaged and that those
structures are valued at $80,000.00 to $85,000.00 each.

These

structures appear to have been in place for less than 20 years in
the case of the McNeils and over 20 years in the case of the Zanes
prior to the filing of this lawsuit.

In addition, the survey plat

which established the actual property boundaries has been a matter
of public record in the Washington County Recorder's Office for over
24 years prior to the filing of the lawsuit.
18.
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There is no evidence before this Court that prior to these

Plaintiffs anyone ever complained about the location of the boundaries or questioned the location of the Defendants1 homes.

All

previous owners in the subdivison have assumed that the boundary
was the center line of the river, althougha routine survey would
have shown the discrepency.
19.

As the subdivision was actually laid out the river would

run through Lots 12 and 13 and divide those lots.

That would leave

small parcels of lots 12 and 13 to the north and west of the river
which would not be suitable for construction of residences and which
would not be accessable from the main portion of those lots without
construction of a bridge at considerable expense in view of the fact
that the river often rises dramatically during the runoff season.
20.

The Plaintiffs have not undertaken construction of impove-

ments on Lots 12 and 13 and there remains on the Southeast side of
the river sufficient area for the Plaintiffs to construct a residence
as they testified they desired to do.

Both the Plaintiffs and the

Defendants1 predecessors in interest purchased their lots with the
clear understanding that the center line of the river was the boundary.

The subdivider and the County tax Assessor also have believed

that such was the case and have so represented the situation to the
property owners.

The Plaintiffs were aware of the boundary dispute

when the purchased Lots 12 and 13.
21.

In weighing these equities the Court is convinced that

requiring the removal of the encroaching structures would not do
equity.

The persons now possession the residences did not construct

them, and did not know that they were encroaching on adjoining
properties at the time that they purchased the property.

In addition,

these is not evidence that the predecessors in interest of these
Plaintiffs ever raised an objection to the construction of the encroaching structures and in fact it appears that those predecessors

bought their land with the understanding that their land only extended
to the center line of the river.
22.

The Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiffs have an

adequate remedy at law since their loss can be compensated by
assessment of damages in their favor.

Assessing damages and allowing

the encroachments to remain will not destroy or significantly hinder
the intended use and enjoyment of the property contemplated by the
Plaintiffs.
23.

There is no evidence before the Court that either the Def-

endants or their predecessors in interest ever paid any taxes on
Lots 12 and 13 of the subject subdivision.

Therefore Adverse

Possession is not applicable.
24.

Under the facts of this case the Court finds that the

Santa Clara River is a sufficient boundary monument for applicaiton
of the doctrine of Boundary Line by Acquiescence.

It is clear from

the testimony of the subdivider that each lot owner who purchased
in the subdivison was told that the river was in fact the boundary.
There is not evidence that the river has moved.

The river is certainly

visible, permanent and stable, and has a definite location.
25.

The evidence clearly shows that the Defendants and their

predecessors in interest have occupied those portions of Lots 12
and 13 north and west of the river and abutting Lots 6 and 7 as thought
the river were the boundary.
26.

The Court finds that no one ever questioned the river being

the bvoundary until 1988.

It appears that everyone living in the

subdivison assumed that the river was the boundary and conducted
themselves accordingly.

The prior owners of Lots 12 and 13 never

disputed the Defendants1 occupation of the now disputed portions
of Lots 12 and 13 prior to these Plaintiffs, for a period of some
23 years after the subdivision was created.

The doctrine of boundary

by acquiescence does not require an agreement between adjoining landowners to establish a particular monument as a boundary.

Rather

it requires only that the adjoining owners treat the monument as
a boundary for the required time period.

This is more akin to a

prescriptive right than a contractual right.
27.

It appears therefore that the owners of Lots 12 and 13

on one side and Lots 6 and 7 on the other did acquiesce in the river
being the boundary line.
28.

It is clear that acquiescence in the boundary by adjoining

property owners must span at least 20 years absent unusual circumstances.

In the case of the Zanes, whose original predecessors in

interest were the Karrs, it is clear that the time requirements for
boundary by acquiescence have been met.

In the case of the McNeils

who traced their interests to the original purchasers., the Myers,
there is some question as to the length of time that acquiescence
has been ongoing.

The evidence is clear with regard to Lot 7 that

it has been occupied by the Zanes or their predecessors in interest
at least since early 1968, as has that portion of Lot 12 north and
west of the Santa Clara River.
29.

The Evidence does not establish when Lot 6 and the portions

of Lots 12 and 13, which are north and west of the river and abut
Lot 6, were occupied by the McNeils1 prececessors in interest.

The

Mcneils have failed to carry their burden of proof on that point.
This Court must find, therefore, that although the McNeils are now
occupying up to the river's edge and have been doing so for a considerable period, there is insufficient evidence to establish that
they have been doing so for at least 20 years.
30.

r
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The Defendants Zane are entitled to judgment of the Court

quieting title in them under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
in and to the following described real property located in Washington

County, State of Utah, to-wit:

Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 7, Brookside Summer Homes
Subdivision and running thence South parallel with the East
boundary line of lot 12 of said subdivison to the center of the Santa
Clara River; thence easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara
River to the East lot line of said Lot 12; thence Northerly along
said east boundary line of said lot 12 to the Northeast corner of
said Lot 12; thence Westerly along the Northerly Boundary Line of
said Lot 12 to the point of beginning.
31.

The Defendants McNeil, having failed to establish a suffi-

cient length of holding for boundary line by acquiescence are not
entitled to any order quieting title to them in any of the involved
real property.
32.

The Defendants raised as a defense to the Plaintiffs1

Complaint the defense of Boundary By Agreement however the Court
finds no such agreement and therefore no merit in such defense.
33.

In addition to the aforesaid findings the Court finds that

the Defendants Zane have showing sufficient evidence to establish
a prescriptive easement in the above entitled real property however
the Defendants McNeil have failed to meet their burden of proof to
support such a claim.
34.

The Defendants McNeil have encroached upon the following

described real property located in Washington County, Utah and
belonging to the Plaintiffs said encroachment being wrongful, said
property being described as follows:
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 6, Brookside Summer Homes
Subdivision and running Southerly parallel with the East boundary
line of Lot 13 of said Subdivision to the center of the Santa Clara
River; thence Easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara River
to the East boundary line of said Lot 13; thence Northerly along
the East boundary line of said lot 13 to the Northeast Corner of
said Lot 13; thence Westerly along the North boundary line of said
Lot 13 to the point of beginning.
Beginning at the Southeast Corner of Lot 6, Brookside Summer Homes .~oC
Subdivision and run thence Southerly parallel with the West
boundry line of lot 12 of said subdivision to the center of the Santa
Clark River; thence Westerly along the center line of said Santa
Clara River to the West boundary line of said lot 12; thence Northerly
along the West boundary line of said lot 12 to the Northwest Corner

of said Lot 12; thence Easterly along the North boundary line of
said Lot 12 to the point of beginning.
35.

As a result of said encroachment the Plaintiffs are

entitled to be paid damages for the loss of their property because
of such encroachment in the amount of 25 cents per square foot so
taken which amount the Court finds as being the fair market value
for said property so taken.
36.

That according to stipulat ion of the parties, the total

square feet taken by said encroachments, described at trial as Parce
B and C and referenced in Findings of Fact No. 34, supra, is 12,798
square feet.

That as a result the amount of damage is 25 cents

multiplied by 12,798 or $3199,50 plus interest at 10 per cent per
annum from May 2, 1989 to date of trial of October 26, 1990 plus
costs and interest on the entire judgment at 12 per cent per annum
from October 26, 1990 until paid in full.
37.

That as soon as judgment is paid the Defendants McNeil

are entitled to have awarded to them title to the property described
in Finding numbesr 34 above.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
As Conclusions of Law from the foregoing Findins of Fact the
Court concludes as follows:
1.

That the Defendants Zane are entitled to an order of this

Court quieting title in them and against Plaintiffs to the real property located in Washington County, Utah and particularly described
in Finding number 30 above.
2.

That the Plaintiffs are entitled to Judgment against the

Defendants McNeil in the principal sum of $3199.50 together with
interest thereron from May 2, 1989 to October 26, 1990 plus costs
and interest on the entire Judgment at 12 per cent per annum from
October 26, 1990 until paid in full.
3.

That upon payment of said Judgment the Defendants McNeil

are entitled to have awarded to them title to the property described
in Finding number 3A above.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated this

} D~

day of-Bay, 1991.

district J^dge
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Phillip L. Foremaster No. 1103
Attorney at Law
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES C. ENGLERT and JO ANN
ENGLERT, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
JUDGMENT
-vsCivil No. 890502581
HENRY E. ZANE and DOROTHY
G. ZANE, husband and wife; and
JOHN A. McNEIL and KATHY
McNEIL, husband and wife,
Defendants.

This matter coming on for trial on October 24 and October 26,
1990 before the Court sitting without a jury and the Plaintiffs being
present and being represented by their attorney Phillip L. Foremaster
and the Defendants and Third-party Plaintiffs being represented by
their attorney Michael D. Hughes and the Third Party Defendant being
present and being represented by his attorney Gary W. Pendleton and
during the course of the trial a stipulation and agreement havinf
fcv been made between the Third-Party Plaintiffs and the Third-Party
.y Defendants and said Third-party Defendant having been thereupon

w
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dismissed from the lawsuit and the parties having presented certain
testimony and exhibits and the Court having been fully advised in
the premises and having caused to be entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and ordered judgment in accordance therewith; ,-.
NOW THEREFORE, it.is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that
title to the following described real property located in Washington

County, State of Utah is hereby quieted in the Defendants Henry E.
Zane and Dorothy G. Zane, husband and wife, and against the Plaintiffs,
said real property being particularly described as follows:
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 7, Brookside Summer Homes
Subdivision and running thence South parallel with the East Boundary
Line of Lot 12 of said subdivision to the center of the Santa Clara
River; thence Easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara River
to the East lot line of said Lot 12; thence Northerly along said
East Boundary Line of said Lot 12 to the Northeast Corner of said
Lot 12; thence Westerly along the Northerly Boundary Line of said
Lot 12 to the point of beginning.
It is further ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Charles C. Englert
and Jo Ann Englert do have judgment against the Defendants John A.
McNeil and Kathie McNeil, husband and wife in the principal sum of
$3199.50 together with interest thereon at the rate of 10 per cent
per annum from May 12, 1989 to October 26, 1990 in the amount of
$466.91, making a total Judgment of $3666.41 together with costs
and interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from October
26, 1990 until paid in full.
It is further ORDERED that upon payment of said Judgment title
to the following described real property located in Washington
County, Utah shall be awarded to the Defendants John A. McNeil and
Kathie McNeil, said property being described as follows:
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 6, Brookside Summer Homes
Subdivision and running thence parallel with the East Boundary Line
of Lot 13 of said Subdivision to the center of the Santa Clara River;
thence Easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara River to
the East Boundary Line of said Lot 13; thence Northerly along the
East boundary line of said Lot 13 to the Northeast Corner of said
Lot 13; thence Westerly along the North Boundary Line of said Lot
13 to the point of beginning.
Beginning at the Southeast Corner of Lot 6, Brookside Summer Homes
Subdivision and running thence Southerly parallel with the West
Boundary Line of Lot 12 of said Subdivision to the center of the
Santa Clara River; thence Westerly along the center line of said
Santa Clara River to the West Boundary Line of said Lot 12; thence
Northerly along the West Boundary Line of said Lot 12 to the Northwest
Corner of said Lot 12; thence Easterly along the North Boundary Line

of §aid Lot 12 to the point of beginning,
Dated this

/Oil

day of *sS^1991.
(J2AS&*~

Judge
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